Secured Transactions History: The Fradulent Myth by Flint, George Lee, Jr.
Volume 29 
Issue 2 Children's Law Issues (Summer 1999) 
Summer 1999 
Secured Transactions History: The Fradulent Myth 
George Lee Flint Jr. 
Recommended Citation 
George L. Flint Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Fradulent Myth, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 363 (1999). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol29/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more 
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS HISTORY: THE
FRAUDULENT MYTH
GEORGE LEE FLINT, JR.*
Legal educators urge beginning law professors to learn the history of their
subject.' Those teaching Anglo-American secured transactions have a difficult
time.' The outstanding feature of that law is the filing in public records required for
court enforcement of the nonpossessory secured transaction against third parties.
So the desired history concerns the legal treatment of the nonpossessory secured
transaction prior to the adoption of the filing requirement and the circumstances
producing that adoption. But scholars writing in the twentieth century on the history
of American secured transactions law typically have not examined these origins.
Instead, their works merely assert an assumption about that historical background.3
And that assumption could not be further from the truth.
These scholars have advanced the view that the chattel mortgage acts legalized
an otherwise fraudulent transaction during the first half of the nineteenth century."
The chattel mortgage acts required a public filing for the validity of the
nonpossessory secured transaction against third parties. The southern American
colonies adopted them in the eighteenth century,5 the northern United States
adopted them in the 1830s,6 and Great Britain adopted one in 1854.'
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966,
M.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E., 1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics),
1973, J.D., 1975, University of Texas at Austin.
1. See Douglas J. Whaley, Teaching Law: Advice for the New Professor, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 127, 128 (1982).
2. A secured transaction insures that a lender gets repaid. In return for the loan, the lender gets an interest
in the borrower's personalty. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37). Secured transactions do not include security interests in
realty, the subject of mortgages. See id. § 9-104(j). Secured transactions differ depending on whether the creditor
takes possession of the collateral, a pledge, or the debtor retains possession of the collateral, a nonpossessory
secured transaction. See id. § 9-102(2).
3. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text for their comments.
4. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text for the scholars.
5. In the South, South Carolina in 1698 and North Carolina in 1715 passed permissive chattel mortgage
acts, those allowing registration for priority yet recognizing the validity of unrecorded chattel mortgages. See 1715
N.C. Laws, ch. 38, § 11, reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 25 (John D. Cushing
comp., 1984); 1698 S.C. Laws, No. 161, p. 3. Maryland in 1729, Virginia in 1734, Georgia in 1755, and British
West Florida in 1770 passed mandatory chattel mortgage acts, requiring filing for validity of chattel mortgages.
See 1755 Ga. Laws, n.c., reprinted in John D. Cushing, comp., THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 44-45,
155 (1981); 1729 Md. Laws, p. 7. 8-9; 1734 Va. Laws, ch. 6, § 4, reprinted in 4 THE STATUrES AT LARGE (William
Waller Hening, comp., 1819-1823), 397; 1770 W. Fla. Laws, n.c., reprinted in Robert R. Rea, comp., THE
Merrms, JOURNALS, AND Acrs OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF BRISH WEST FLORIDA 377 (1979). Another
southern colony, Delaware, in its fraudulent conveyance statute of 1741 prohibited bills of sale of goods without
delivery with respect to creditors. See 1741 Del. Laws, n.c., reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE 236 (John D. Cushing, comp., 1981).
6. In the North, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut passed mandatory chattel mortgage
statutes in 1832, followed by New York in 1833, Rhode Island in 1834, Vermont in 1838, and Maine in 1839. See
1832 Conn. Laws, ch. 7, p. 377; 1839 Me. Laws, ch. 390, p. 557; 1832 Mass. Laws, ch. 157, p. 460; 1832 N.H.
Laws, ch. 80, p. 58; 1833 N.Y. Laws, ch. 279, p. 402; 1834 R.I. Laws, p. 53; 1838 Vt. Laws, ch. 27, p. 17.
Western states in the north followed later with Indiana and Wisconsin Territory (including Minnesota
as part of Wisconsin Territory) in 1838, Iowa Territory in 1840, Illinois in 1845, and Michigan and Ohio in 1846.
See 1845 M. Laws, p. 41; 1838 Ind. Laws, p. 470; 1839 Iowa Terr. Laws, ch. 54, p. 75; Mich. Rev. St. 1846, ch.
81, § 10; 1846 Ohio Laws, p. 61; 1838 Wis. Laws, p. 163. Minnesota incorporated the laws of Wisconsin in 1849.
Minnesota Territorial Act, § 12, 9 U.S. Stat. 403, 407 (1849).
7. England passed the Bill of Sale Act in 1854. See 17 & 18 Vict, ch. 36, reprinted in 46 GREAT BRITAIN,
THE STATUTES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRIrAIN AND IRELAND, (1854).
England, unlike the United States, also lacked a recording statute for realty prior to 1875, see 38 & 39
Vict., ch. 87 (1875), except in York and Middlesex Counties after 1704 and 1708, respectively. See 2 & 3 Anne,
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According to these scholars, the Anglo-American nonpossessory secured
transaction did not exist until the nineteenth century. Their most prominent
spokesman, Grant Gilmore,' provided the typical statement:
Until early in the nineteenth century the only security devices which were
known in our legal system were the mortgage of real property and the pledge of
chattels. Security interest in personal property which remained in the borrower's
possession during the loan period were unknown.'
Gilmore believed that prior to the nineteenth century courts deemed the
nonpossessory secured transaction a fraudulent transaction due to the separation of
title and possession:
A transfer of an interest in personal property without delivery of possession was
looked on as being in essence a fraudulent conveyance, invalid against creditors
and purchasers. This principle, which was common both to sales law and to
security law, dates from at least 1601 and the decision in Twyne's Case ....
Since the principle maintained itself for over two hundred years--few rules of
law enjoy so long a run-we must conclude that it corresponded to the needs of
its time.'0
One of Gilmore's students perpetuated this fraudulent conveyance theory in a
well-respected casebook."' Thomas Jackson contended that "common law judges
in the first half of the nineteenth century [refused] to enforce security interests in
personal property where the debtor remained in possession of the collateral.""
Other twentieth century American scholars also propounded this myth as truth. 3 As
ch. 4 (1704), reprinted in 8 GREAT BRITAIN, STATUrES OF THE REALM 253 (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1810-
28) [hereinafter STAT. OF REALM] (York Registry Act; required); 7 Anne, ch. 20 (1708), reprinted in 9 STAT. OF
REALM 89 (Middlesex Registry Act; required); A.K.R. KIRAFY, POTrER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUcTIoN TO ENGLISH
LAW AND IrS INsTrruTnoNs 527 (4th ed. 1958). Instead, English real estate law required physical possession of the
deed for subsequent transfers of realty, including mortgages. See, e.g., Head v. Egerton, 3 P. Wins. 280, 24 Eng.
Rep. 1065 (Ch. 1734) (mortgage of first mortgagee who did not endeavor to obtain title documents from debtor
is subsequent to second mortgagee since he was an accessory to inducing the second mortgagee to lend); Peter v.
Russell, 2 Vern. 726, 23 Eng. Rep. 1076 (Ch. 1716) (mortgage of first mortgagee, induced to lend realty lease
documentation to debtor, is subsequent to second mortgagee if first mortgagee knew of debtor's intent to obtain
further lending).
8. Grant Gilmore was a law professor at Yale University, respected legal historian, and a draftsman of the
article of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with secured transactions. For Gilmore's expertise in secured
transactions, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY xxv (1987) (calling Gilmore the chief architect of Article 9). Gilmore wrote
two books on legal history: GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) and GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES
OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
9. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 24 (1965).
10. d; see infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 806,
76 Eng. Rep. 809, sub nor. Chamberlain v. Twyne, Moo. KB. 638,72 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601).
11. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 8, at xxv (student of Gilmore).
12. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 8, at 8. Jackson also accepted the fraudulent conveyance reasoning and
absence of chattel mortgage acts until the nineteenth century. See id. at 21, 35; see also Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L REV. 175,
178 (1983) (for 400 years, if a creditor desired to enforce a secured transaction, it had to make it possible of
discovery by others).
13. See RICHARD E. SPEiDEL, Er AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS, TEACHING MATERIALS 49 (5th ed. 1993)
(the industrial revolution caused the chattel mortgage acts of the 1 820s increasing personalty wealth and solving
the fraudulent conveyance problem); RAYMOND T. NIMMER & INGRID MICHELSEN HILLINGER, COMMERCIAL
[Vol. 29
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a result these scholars have led generations of American lawyers to believe that
Anglo-American law tolerates the fraudulent nonpossessory secured transaction
only to accommodate the wealthy and sophisticated at the expense of the poor and
unsophisticated. 4
Common sense indicates that Gilmore's fraudulent conveyance theory could not
be correct. Businessmen generally do not use, and hence would not develop over the
requisite time period, a transaction under which they know no court would enforce
their rights against the third parties that matter to secured parties." Such actions
would cost their businesses too much.
This article provides a more reasonable explanation for the rise of the
nonpossessory secured transaction in Anglo-American jurisdictions and exposes the
legal prerequisites to their rise. Not all jurisdictions enforce nonpossessory secured
transactions against third parties. The Napoleonic Code of 1804, following ancient
Germanic legal traditions, banned them.'6 Latin American countries adopted
versions of the Napoleonic Code in the nineteenth century. 7 Many still ban
nonpossessory secured transactions."s Yet ancient Roman law hinted at a different
scenario. Primitive Roman law required human hostages providing slave labor to
the secured party.'9 Later Roman law substituted personalty for the hostage allowing
its use by the secured party, creating the pledge.20 Use of the personalty similarly
generated income to repay the debt. And more recent Roman law permitted debtor
use of the personalty to work off the debt, giving rise to the nonpossessory secured
transaction.2' But ancient Roman law never developed a filing requirement for
enforcement against third parties.22
TRANSACTIONS: SECURED INANCING, CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 42 (1992) (industrial revolution resulted in
chattel mortgage acts, which legalized otherwise fraudulent conveyance); Douglas Baird, Notice Filing and the
Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53-54 (1983) (a secured transaction was a fraudulent
conveyance from 7Wyne's Case until development of chattel mortgage acts about 200 hundred years ago); 2
GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AND PREFERENCES 849 (rev. ed. 1940) (the chattel mortgage is an
impossible device due to the fraudulent conveyance statute, citing a bankruptcy case, Ryall); infra notes 173-76
and accompanying text for a discussion of Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 165, 26 Eng. Rep. 107, sub nom. Ryall v. Rowles,
1 Ves. Sen. 348, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074 (Ch. 1750).
14. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Security Interest and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories,
10J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1981).
15. With respect to the debtor, the transaction amounts merely to a contract enforced by the court under the
usual contract principles. See, e.g.. 13 Eliz. I, ch. 5. § 1 (1571), reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at
537 (fraudulent conveyance enforceable between parties).
16. See CODE NAPOLEON art. 2118 (1960) (can mortgage only immovables) & art. 2119 (can not mortgage
movables); infra note 51 for ancient Germanic law.
17. See KENNETH KARST & KErTH S. ROSENN, LAw AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATiN AMERICA: A CASEBOOK
45-46 (1975).
18. See, e.g., DISTRrr FEDERAL, COD1GO CwnL 498 (art. 2893) (1991) (parties can only mortgage realty
and associated personalty).
19. See, e.g., H.F. JOLOWiCZ, HITORICAL INTRODUCION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 162, 313-17
(1952); Roger J. Goebel, Reconstructing the Roman Law of Real Security, 36 TUL. L REV. 29, 32 (1961) (theory
thatfiducia not enforced by courts in early Republican Rome relected in Roman preference for personal security
rather than real security); see also Nehemiah 5:1-5 (sons and daughters become slaves under pledge).
20. See, e.g., JOLOWIC., supra note 19, at 317-18; Goebel, supra note 19, at 32-34 (pignus replaced
fiducia), see also Genesis 38:17-20 (pledge of signet, cord, and staff).
21. See, e.g.. JOLOwKc2, supra note 19, at 319-20; Goebel, supra note 19, at 35-36 (hypoteca developed
in late republican or early empire periods).
22. See, e.g., Boris Kozolchuk, The Mexican Land Registry: A Critical Evaluation, 12 ARIZ. L REV. 308
(1970) (recording practices in civil law countries comes from Germany of the Middle Ages, not Roman law). See
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Finding a pre-chattel mortgage act court's enforcement of a nonpossessory
secured transaction against third parties would disprove Gilmore's fraudulent
theory. This article generally limits the search for early examples of the Anglo-
American nonpossessory secured transaction to the printed appellate opinions.23
Those opinions contain no nonpossessory secured transactions until the latter part
of the seventeenth century.' A better source might be the less accessible lower and
local court records.25 But the chosen sources dispel Gilmore's fraudulent
conveyance myth. These opinions reveal many courts enforcing the nonpossessory
secured transaction against third parties prior to the passage of the respective chattel
mortgage act.26
The present study differs from the fraudulent theorists' approach by focusing on
all the readily fimdable, reported English opinions involving nonpossessory secured
transactions before the nineteenth century, rather than just those susceptible to the
fraudulent theorists' interpretation. The opinions reveal four different rules to
handle third party challenges to the nonpossessory secured transaction, only one of
which is the per se fraud rule hypothesized by Gilmore.27 And it only applied to
merchant bankruptcies in England. The present investigation also differs from the
eighteenth century judges' efforts by considering primarily only those opinions
dealing with the nonpossessory secured transaction. These judges and their
American counterparts made no distinction between situations involving
nonpossessory sales with intent to create a security interest and nonpossessory sales
without that intent. They used the same legal rules in both cases.
This new interpretation accounts for the absence of the nonpossessory secured
transaction during the Middle Ages and dates its appearance during the latter part
of the seventeenth century. The first section of this article provides the background
for the rise of the nonpossessory secured transaction. The earliest pronouncements
of the English common law, in the twelfth century, record the Norman use of the
ancient Germanic ban of the nonpossessory secured transaction. During the fifteenth
century, the two forms developed that would eventually permit the transfer of
personalty without delivery under a nonpossessory secured transaction despite the
Germanic ban. Although the forms became available before the sixteenth century,
parties had no incentive to develop the nonpossessory secured transaction until the
security devices then in use became undesirable or ineffective. Those security
devices were the pledge, recognized by Gilmore, and the collusive judgment. The
allowance of interest after 1571 removed the principle reason for the pledge. The
pledge had the capability of generating interest despite the usury ban. The 1677
also infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
23. This is the method of legal historians before 1950. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Amenrican Legal History:
Past and Present, 34 J. LEG. EDuc. 563, 566 (1984) (pre-1950 legal historians describe the development of legal
doctrines internally through appellate opinions, ignoring the socioeconomic context). For an example of this
method, see infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (the first realty mortgage with debtor possession; such
mortgages uncommon during the English Civil War).
24. See GLENN, supra note 13, at 845 (no nonpossessory secured transactions appear in the reported English
cases before the eighteenth century).
25. This is the method of the Wisconsin School of legal history after 1950. See Friedman, supra note 23,
at 565.
26. See infra notes 195 & 244 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 112-96 and accompanying text.
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Statute of Frauds destroyed the priority of the collusive judgment, changing its
priority from the date of the judgment entered prior to the loan to the delivery of the
writ of execution to the sheriff for execution.28
The latter two sections of the article provide evidence directly contradicting the
fraudulent conveyance theory, both in England and in America, prior to the
adoption of the respective chattel mortgage act. Third parties challenged the priority
of the nonpossessory secured transaction under both the fraudulent conveyance and
bankruptcy statutes, both in England and in the United States. Yet judges in
numerous opinions upheld the nonpossessory secured transaction long before the
passage of the respective chattel mortgage act.
This study importantly eliminates Gilmore's implication of the nonpossessory
secured transaction as a fraudulent transaction 29 and redirects investigation of the
origin of the nonpossessory secured transaction and hence its purpose, necessity,
and meaning away from the nineteenth century to its true time period, the
seventeenth century. The nineteenth century bears only on why certain secured
parties desired filings, while other creditors desired to prohibit the nonpossessory
secured transaction. These parties would never have developed their positions over
the passage of the chattel mortgage acts if they had never experienced any problems
from using the nonpossessory secured transaction under prior law. Consequently,
the chattel mortgage acts deemed nonpossessory secured transactions fraudulent
when challenged by third parties, unless filed, in order to force the filing. Gilmore
seized upon this aspect of the chattel mortgage acts, extrapolated this deemed
fraudulent provision back in time, and incorrectly concluded that before the chattel
mortgage acts, courts viewed the nonpossessory secured transaction as fraudulent. 0
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONPOSSESSORY SECURED TRANSACTION
Gilmore correctly ascertained that Anglo-Americans did not use the
nonpossessory secured transaction during the early Stuart Period. His interpretative
error lay in hypothesizing a fraudulent conveyance objection. The English common
28. Collusive judgments generally include recognizances, statutes merchant, and statutes staple. This article
refers to them as collusive judgments because the secured party obtained the judgment prior to the lending with
the cooperation of the debtor. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
29. Having ruled out a moral or historical justification for the existence of secured credit, Gilmore's student
focussed on an economic justification. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and
Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE LJ. 1143 (1979); see also Francis, Practice, Strategy, and Institution: Debt
Collection in the English Common Law Courts, 1740-1840, 80 Nw. U. L REV. 807, 843-868 (economic
interpretation fails to account for why parties did not pursue certain profit-maximizing strategies for debt collection
in England from 1740 to 1840). The problem of this approach, however, is the perception that larger firms generally
use unsecured credit, while small firms use secured credit. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of
Secured Credit, I 10 HARV. L REV. 626, 628-30 (1997) (summarizing the various theories and their drawbacks).
The economic justification tends to conclude all lenders should become secured. See, e.g., Paul M. Shupack,
Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RuTGERS L REv. 1067, 1122 (1989) (the model predicts every
loan will be secured, if the costs of creating security interests is less than the cost of alternatives). Literature on the
topic is legion. See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76 TEX. L
REV. 595, 620 (1998); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 857, 862-63 n.23 (1996) (providing numerous citations).
30. See also Bullock v. Williams, 33 Mass. 33 (1834) (CJ. Lemuel Shaw: "It appears to have been the
intent of this 'chattel mortgage statute' to enable the owners of personal property to make a valid transfer, by way
of mortgage or conditional sale, to stand as a security, and of course available against third persons .... ").
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law from a much earlier date had not enforced a secured transaction nor a mortgage,
if the debtor had possession of the collateral.3 This early pronouncement of the
English common law followed early Germanic legal tradition rather than Roman
law. English fraudulent conveyance law, not yet formulated, had no relation to this
rule.32
A. The Norman Prohibition
Only certain courts of the king, primarily the King's Bench and the Court of
Common Pleas founded under Henry II and Henry III, used the English common
law.33 The king's courts initially only dealt with matters of importance to the king
and involving amounts in controversy above a specified amount. 4 Other courts,
such as county, borough, and manor courts, ecclesiastical courts, and courts of pie
poudre at fairs and later staple courts in towns with foreign trade for merchants,
dealt with other matters but lacked the ability to seize a defendant's property or
person, rights held by the king's courts.35 So a creditor might prefer a suit in a king's
court for matters involving recalcitrant debtors. Due to the lack of existing or
published records for these other courts, however, historians do not know the rules
used by them as well as for the English common law. 36 Generally, however, the
rules used by these courts did not affect the English common law except when the
king's courts would adopt rules from these other courts as a source for the English
common law.37 It is unlikely that the king's courts adopted rules for the
nonpossessory secured transaction from such courts.38
During its early formative period in the twelfth century, the English common law,
as delineated by Glanville, mentioned the same two security devices for personalty
as used under the much earlier Roman law, applicable in Britain hundreds of years
before.39 Roman law recognized at least two types of security arrangements for
31. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text (for a description of the statutes). Prevention of frauds
was the responsibility of the Chancery, since the common law did not know frauds before the passage of the various
statutes concerning fraud. See COLIN RH'Ys LOVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY: A SURVEY
220 (1962).
33. See Ralph V. Turner, The Medieval English Royal Courts: The Problem of Their Origins, 27 HISTORIAN
471,497 (1964) (the King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas); J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 12, 16-18 (1979).
34. See BAKER, supra note 33, at 21 (land disputes and after the Statute of Gloucester of 1278 trespass
actions above 40 shillings).
35. See id at 21-22,25,27, 110-14; Edward Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L REV. 135, 137-
140 (1915) (merchant courts).
36. See Kiralfy, supra note 7, at 190-91 (merchant courts and unpublished records).
37. See Kevin M. Teeven, The Contract Jurisdiction and Procedures of Medieval Courts, 5 GLENDALE L
REV. 35, 41 (1986) (use of assumpsit for contract from Middlesex County Court in fourteenth century); Kiralfy,
supra note 7, at 208 (Lord Mansfield's incorporation of mercantile law in eighteenth century).
38. The Jewish Exchequer, a special court for enforcing Jewish customs among Jews prior to their expulsion
from England in 1290, did recognize mortgages with debtor retention subject to a registration system established
by Richard L See PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 605-06 (1956); POIACK & MALiAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1124 (2d ed. 1911) (speculating that it might have
so developed had Edward I not expelled the Jews).
39. Glanville knew Roman law texts, anticipated that his readers had some knowledge of Roman law, and
frequently provided the Roman law roles but noted the king's courts took no notice of them. See PLUCKNEIr, supra
note 38, at 298.
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personalty, one recognizable as a pledge and the other, as a nonpossessory secured
transaction. Under the pignus the debtor transferred by agreement possession of an
item of personalty to the creditor as security for the debtor's discharge of an
obligation by a specified date after which the creditor could sell the item, if agreed,
or sue to keep the item to satisfy the claim (the action of impetratio dominii), with
any balance of the claim over the value of the item going to the debtor, who had a
right of redemption. 0
Under the hypotheca the debtor created a charge by agreement against the item
of personalty (originally a tenant's goods or an agricultural tenant's crops but later
also other personalty) in the creditor without transfer of either ownership or
possession until the time of performance of the debtor's obligation had passed with
the creditor able to sue the debtor (the action of interdictum Salvianum) or a third
party (the action of quasi Serviana) to which possession of the item had passed.4'
Since possession for the hypotheca remained with the debtor, the debtor could place
successive charges on the item.42 Consequently, Roman law required a debtor to
inform successive chargees of those charges and their value prior to making the
successive charge or face civil and criminal liability for fraud.43 Roman law did not
require recordation for validity but provided that hypothecas made before notary
publics or before three witnesses had priority over others not so made.' Generally,
priority in time confirmed priority in right.45
Twelfth century English common law treated these two types of security devices
because of trade with western Europe. Some of these jurisdictions recognized these
devices.' After the Norman Conquest English policy fostered industry and
commerce by inducing foreigners to come to make up perceived deficiencies in
English production.47 These foreigners would use the familiar techniques.
The gage with delivery of the possession of personalty to the creditor resembled
the pignus. For this gage the king's courts provided an action to force the debtor to
redeem the collateral, thereby paying the creditor.48
The gage under which a debtor could receive a loan but need not deliver the
personalty subject to the security interest resembled the hypotheca.49 But, for this
gage if the debtor refused to keep the agreement, the creditor might have no
effective remedy. The king's courts in the twelfth century refused to enforce such
40. See J.A.C. THOMAS, THE lNswTrurEs OF JUSTINIAN 205-06 (1975).
41. See id. at 206, 284.
42. See MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 206 (1927) (a not infrequent practice).
43. See id. at 207;THOMAS, supra note 40, at 206.
44. See 14 THE CIvil LAW INCLUDING THE TWELVE TABLES, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, THE RULES OF
ULPIAN, THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS, THE ENACTMENTS OF JUSTINIAN, AND THE CONSITrUrIONS OF LEO 267 (Samuel
Parsons Scott, trans., 1973) [hereinafter THE CVIL LAw](Code of Justinian. bk. VIII, tit. 18, § 11); RADIN, supra
note 42, at 207.
45. See CIvIL LAW supra note 44, at 139-40 (first in time, Digest of Justinian, bk. XX, tit. 4, § 12(10)), at
292-93 (same time equal, Digest of Justinian, bk. XlIi, tit. 7, § 20); RADIN, supra note 42, at 207.
46. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OFTHE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
349 (1983) (chattel mortgage developed in western Europe during the late eleventh, twelfth, and early thirteenth
centuries).
47. See HAZELTINE, The Gage of Land in Medieval England, 18 HARV. L REV. 36,43 (1904).
48. See THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED
GLANVLLE 122-23 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965) (Glanville, bk. X, chs. 7) [hereinafter TREATISE].
49. See id. at 123 (Glanville, bk. X, ch. 8).
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agreements in order to avoid the problem of pronouncing on the rights of several
prior and subsequent creditors that might arise when debtors gaged personalty
without transfer of possession.' Glanville's rule reflected Germanic law. Germanic
law, less commercially oriented than Roman law, banned the nonpossessory secured
transaction.5' The evil the Germans found in the secured transaction dealt with the
interference with making a livelihood in an era when debtors devoted most of their
personalty to subsistence.52 The Normans under Henry II merely followed their
Germanic tradition. The creditor, however, still had the availability of other courts,
but they lacked the ability to seize the debtor's property or person.53
B. The Development of the Transfer Forms
Before the English common law could accept a nonpossessory secured
transaction and for as long as it refused to adopt a Roman law approach, it needed
to develop a method for transferring personalty without delivery of possession.
During the early formative period, the English common law only recognized
transfers of personalty by delivery of possession and permitted their recovery when
wrongfully taken under the action of detinue.5' Since the pledge involved a delivery
of possession, the king's courts would enforce it.55 Consequently, the pledge became
a standard method in England of taking a security interest in personalty during the
Middle Ages.56
Exceptions to the requirement of delivery of possession did not develop until the
fifteenth century. The fit-st recognized exception dealt with the contract of sale for
a chattel without delivering possession. Originally, the purchaser in such a situation
could not recover the goods sold under detinue since he never had possession.5" But
by 1442 the king's court viewed the sales agreement as a grant of the right to
possession and so the purchaser in such a situation could recover the goods sold
50. See idL at 124 (Glanville, bk. X, ch. 8) (refusing to recognize nonpossessory security interests both in
personalty and in realty in order to avoid formulating such a rule).
51. See RUDOLF HUEBNER, A HISTORY OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW 440-47 (1918). Originally Germanic
law even partially banned the pledge, permitting it only on basis of judicial authorization. See also THE LAWS OF
THE SALIAN FRANKS 114 (tit. 50), 147 (tit. 103), 194 (tit. 29) (Katherine Fischer Drew, trans., 1991) (pignus
banned except as part of the judgment process for enforcing debts); THE VISGOTmC CODE (FORUM JUDIcuM) 177-
80 (Samuel Parsons Scott trans., 1910) (bk. 5, tit. 6, I. 3 & 5) (same); THE BURGUNDIAN CODE 36-37 (tiL 19)
(same) (Katherine Fischer Drew, trans., 1972); THE LOMBARD LAws 101-03 (arts. 245 to 252) (same) (Katherine
Fischer Drew trans., 1973).
52. See, e.g., TiE BURGUNDAN CODE, supra note 51. at 87 (tit. 105) (prohibition of taking a judicial pledge
of oxen, bondservants, horses, or cattle).
53. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
54. See POLLACK & MAm.AND, supra note 38, at 173-74 (developed from the action of debt), 179; 3
WIujAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 353-54 (5th ed. 1966) (1942); see also TREATISE supra note
48, at 128 (Glanville, bk X, ch. 13: action of debt under Henry II).
55. See POLLACK & MAmLAND, supra note 38, at 179 (only known gage during the Middle Ages was the
pledge).
56. See id But see. PLUCKNETr, supra note 38, at 606-07 (statutory forms of security were more popular
than mortgages, which in the Middle Ages required creditor possession of the realty). See infra notes 73-84 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these statutory security devices.
57. 3 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 54, at 355 & n.2 (citing Y.B. 7 Hen. TV. Pasch. pl. 10 (1406) & 50 Ed. IL
Trin. pl. 8 (1377)).
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under detinue even though he never had actual possession."8 This form did not
require written documentation.59
The second recognized exception dealt with a transfer by deed, a sealed
document, without delivery of possession. Originally, the validity of transfers by
deed required delivery.6° But by 1465 the king's court viewed the covenant under
the deed as another grant of the right of possession.6'
In accordance with these two exceptions to the delivery requirement, pre-chattel
mortgage act nonpossessory secured transactions generally took the form of a sale
subject to conditions defeasance or reconveyance regarding payment of the debt:
the conditional bill of sale, the chattel mortgage, or the deed of trust. The difference
between conditional bills of sale and chattel mortgages involved redemption and the
risk of loss for the collateral. Under the chattel mortgage the debtor retained
equitable title for purposes of reacquiring the collateral in equity court, a
redemption, for a reasonable period after default.62 A conditional bill of sale
eliminated this right of redemption; instead, the debtor had a right to repurchase, the
conditions of which the debtor had to satisfy or lose the right to repurchase.63 For
a conditional bill of sale the risk of loss lay on the secured party, while for a chattel
mortgage, on the debtor.64 The deed of trust resembled the chattel mortgage except
instead of the secured party obtaining title to the collateral a third party, the trustee,
received title.65 Under all three forms the pre-chattel mortgage act nonpossessory
secured transaction constituted a sale. So its priority, if recognized, dated from the
date of the sale.'
58. See id. at 355-56 & n.5 (citing Y.B. 17 Ed. IV. Pasch. pl. 2 (1475), reprinted in C.H.S. FIFOOT,
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACr 252 (1949); 49 Hen. Vl Mich. pl. 23 (1471);
37 Hen. VI. Mich. pl. 18 (1459), reprinted in FIFOOT, supra at 249; 20 Hen. VI. Trin. pl. 4 (1442), reprinted in
FIFOOT, supra at 347; see also Anon., 1 Dyer 30a, 73 Eng. Rep. 65 (C.P. 1537).
59. See M.P. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE &FFOT, LAW OFCONTRACr 9 (10th ed. 1981).
60. See Anon., Jenk. 108, 109, 145 Eng. Rep. 76 (Exch. 1459) (Y.B. 37 Hen. VI 6, pl. 13).
61. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 357 & n.3 (gift, citing Y.B. 7 Ed. IV. Mich. pl. 21 (1465));
Frederick Pollock, Gifts of Chattels without Delivery, 6 LAw Q. REV. 446, 448 (1890).
In the fifteenth century the deed transfer is termed a deed of gift, but grantors could make such gifts for
consideration (sales) or blood (a modem gift). See Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 8I, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 814 (Star
Chamber 1601); see also 3 HODSWORTH, supra at 358 & n.1 (sale by deed of gift, citing Y.B. 27 Hen. VULI, Trin.
pl. 6, p. 16 (1536)).
62. See, e.g., Roberts v. Cocke, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 121, 127 (Ch. 1822); Robertson v. Campbell, 6 Va. (2
Call.) 421,428 (ch. 1800); Chapman v. Turner, 5 Va. (1 Call.) 280, 288 (ch. 1798). See also LEONARD JONES, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 196 (1881) (a reasonable time for redemption,
a remedy provided by the chancery court, not the common law courts). Roberts, Robertson, and Chapman all dealt
with pledges since the secured party had possession; however, the court treated the pledge situation as a chattel
mortgage.
63. See, e.g., Roberts, 22 Va. at 127; Robertson, 6 Va. at 424; Chapman, 5 Va. at 288.
64. See, e.g., Roberts, 22 Va. at 126; Robertson, 6 Va. at 422; Chapman, 5 Va. at 288.
65. See, e.g., M'Broom v. Rives, I Stew. 72, 73 (Ala. 1827); Malone v. Hamilton, 1 Minor 286, 287 (Ala.
1824).
66. Some states developed a lien theory for mortgages, where legal title to the land remained with the debtor.
See William F. Walsh, Development of the Title and Lien Theories of Mortgage, 9 N.Y.U. LQ. 280 (1932) (land);
William H. Uoyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory, 32 YALE LJ. 233-43 (1923) (land: South Carolina
in 1791 by statute and New York in 1809 based on comments of Great Britain's Lord Mansfield in 1778). For the
old title rule, see Rockwell v. Bradley, 2 Conn. 1 (1816); Blaney v. Bearce, 2 Me. 132 (1822); Brown v. Cram, 1
N.H. 169 (1818); Erskine v. Townsend, 2 Mass. 493 (1807); Simpson v. Ammons, 10 Pa. (1 Binn.) 176 (1806).
For the new lien rule, see Huntington v. Smith, 4 Conn. 236 (1822); Brown v. Bates, 55 Me. 520 (1868); Blanchard
v. Colbum, 16 Mass. 345 (1820); Glass v. Ellison, 9 N.H. 69 (1837); Jackson v. Willard, 4 Johns. 41 (N.Y. 1809);
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But mere formulation of a form, either the conditional bill of sale or a conditional
deed (chattel mortgage), did not immediately result in parties using nonpossessory
secured transactions. One attempt to locate early examples of such security interests
turned up only pledges, one in 1452 and the other in 1597.67 Use of these forms as
security interests required an incentive.
C. The Statutory Incentive
The incentive for nonpossessory secured transactions with debtor retention of the
collateral's possession developed only when the advantages of the alternative
security devices in use during the Middle Ages before the development of the form
for the nonpossessory secured transaction ceased. Two alternative security devices
for personalty, the pledge and the collusive judgment, enabled the Glanville
preference toward creditor possession of the collateral. Parties also used these two
security devices in the American colonies during the seventeenth century. 68
First, English law prohibited the taking of interest on loans.' English lawmakers
Rickert v. Maderia, 33 Pa. (1 Rawle) 325 (1829). So the switch occurred predominantly in the 1820s.
In contrast, chattel mortgage law rejected the lien theory to retain the tide theory. See Langdon v. Buell,
9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. 1832); JONES, supra note 62, at 527. Courts treated the granting of a lien on personalty for
security generally as a chattel mortgage. See id. at 12-13. Modem secured transaction law rejects the title theory,
see, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-207(37), as did Roman law. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
67. See GLENN, supra note 13, at 842 (describing a pledge of jewels with all the elements of a chattel
mortgage present but with transfer of possession by Richard, Duke of York, father of Edward IV; a pledge of silver
plate in Bateman v. Elman, Cro. Eliz. 866,78 Eng. Rep. 1083 (K.B. 1597)).
There exist several early cases where possession and ownership of goods are separated and ownership
rights recognized without delivery, but do not involve security interests. See, e.g., Brand v. Lisley, Yelv. 164, 80
Eng. Rep. 109 (C.P. 1609) (debtors delivery and bailment of goods to defendant for satisfaction of plaintiff-creditor
enforceable by plaintiff-creditor, but reason is contract between plaintiff to forebear delivery for defendant's
promise to pay in future); Clark's Case, 2 Leon. 30, 74 Eng. Rep. 333 (Ex. 1590) (debtor's delivery and bailment
of goods to bailee for satisfaction of debt to third-party creditor not subject to be set aside by Crown when
subsequently the debt is assigned to the Crown). Brand and Clark are cited in Ryall v. Rowles, I Ves. Sen. 348,
350, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1075 (Ch. 1750) (argument of bankruptcy assignees), as cases involving an enforceable
sale under a sealed document without delivery. See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
68. See Burton v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 464,480 (Virginia adopted the Second Statute of Westminister);
Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland Ch. 284, 303 (Md. 1831) (before 1732 parties used recognizances in Maryland); Tessier
v. Wyse, 3 Bland Ch. 28, 39 (Md. 1830) (parties used statute merchant and staple in Maryland); Hutcheson v.
Grubbs, 80 Va. 251, 254 (1885) (Virginia adopted the Second Statute of Westminister at an early date); Borst v.
Nalle, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 423, 428 (same); 2 PHtmp BRucE, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF VIRGINIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY 369 (1935) (from York Co., Va., records of 1638 to 1648, merchants required planters to provide security
for credit of mortgages recorded in county records and judgments consented to and recorded in the courts prior to
the lending). But see Longworth v. Screven, 16 S.C.L 298 (1834) (statutes staple and merchant never expressly
made in force in South Carolina). See infra note 79 for the Second Statute of Westminister.
In 1732 British creditors of Americans procumed a statute allowing them to execute judgments against
American land the same as personalty. See 5 Go. II, ch. 7 (1732); 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 429 (1884). Although parties could use recognizances to levy against land, recognizances disappeared in
Maryland when they lost their priority under the State of Frauds. Moreover, several American colonies permitted
execution on land after depleting nonexempt personalty. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments
in American Law--A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L REV. 155, 165 (1957) (Massachusetts in
1647, Connecticut in 1641), & 168 (Pennsylvania in 1688).
South Carolina did not become commercial until the end of the eighteenth century, after passage of the
1677 Statute of Frauds. See ifra note 86 and accompanying text for the significance of the 1677 Statute of Frauds.
69. See 3 Hen. VI, ch. 6 (1487), reprinted in 2 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 515 (declaring interest
agreements void); 15 Edw. I, st. 1, ch. 5 (1341), reprinted in 1 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 296 (restatement of
Glanville's rule); TREATISE, supra note 48, at 84 (Glanville, bk. VIL ch. 16 (1180)) (charger of interest forfeits
chattels to king on death); Leges Edw. Confessoris, ch. 37 (1043 & 1066 (charging interest a crime)); GEORGE
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based the interest prohibition, consistent with the Medieval practice of borrowing
for consumption and not production, on Catholic teaching derived from Aristotle's
view that all interest was unlawful because money did not breed money and the
literal Biblical prohibition.7° With possession the creditor could surreptitiously
obtain profits and rents from use of the realty or personalty, circumventing the
prohibition." The pledge, however, required knowledge of how, or ability, to use
the collateral to produce income to replace the prohibited interest.
This preference and drawback disappeared with the Protestant Reformation and
the authorization of interest first between 1545 to 1552 and permanently in 1571.72
Lack of that use knowledge or ability and the removal of the interest prohibition
would naturally disfavor the pledge after 1571.
Second, English law provided for collusive judgments as a security device. The
collusive judgment became the more serious competitor of the nonpossessory
secured transaction since it possessed both priority and speedy levy. The collection
remedies in the king's courts for creditor's initially involved hazards and delays,
such as difficulties getting the debtor into court, meeting the defense of wager of
law for the debt action, depending on the appearance of witnesses, losing or marring
a deed under seal for the covenant action (which extinguished the action), and
limiting levy to the debtor's personalty.73 So in the early thirteenth century, creditors
devised debts of record, a collusive judgment, by enrolling their deeds on the king's
courts' rolls and obtaining shortly thereafter a writ of execution prior to the lending,
obviating proof problems, to overcome some of these hindrances.74 This procedure
OSBORNE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 10 (1970); WilliamF Fratcher, Restraints on Alienation of
Equitable Interests in Michigan Property, 51 MICH. L REV. 509, 539-41 (1953); 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54,
at 101-103; POUJACK & MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 123.
70. See 8 HOLDsWORTH, supra note 54, at 101 (citing Clement V's canon of 1311); 2 THE WORKS OF
ARiSTOTLE 452 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952); Luke 6:35 (lend, expecting nothing in return).
71. See, e.g., Coggs v. Bernard, 2 IAd. Raym. 909,916-17,92 Eng. Rep. 107, 112 (K.B. 1704) (if the pawn
be worse for using, such as cloths or linen, pawnee can not use; but if the pawn not worse for use, such as jewels,
earrings, or bracelets, pawnee may use them but is liable if lost); Mores v. Conham, Owen 123, 74 Eng. Rep. 94b
(C.P. 1609) (pawned goods may be used by pawnee as an owner, pawnee can work horse or ox or take cow's milk,
but is subject to action if he misuses pawned goods). See OSBORNE, supra note 69, at 10; William F. Fratcher,
supra note 69, at 439-41; POLLACK & MArILAND, supra note 38, at 123.
72. See 13 Eliz., ch. 8 (1571), reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 542 (a limit of 10 percent
per annum interest; to continue for 5 years and then until the next Parliament), continued by 27 Eliz., ch. 11 (1585),
reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 718, continued by 29 Eliz., ch. 5 (1587), reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM,
supra at 770, continued by 31 Eliz., ch. 10 (1589), reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 808, continued by 35
Eliz., ch. 7 (1593), reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM. supra at 854, made permanent by 39 Eliz., ch. 18 (1597),
reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 917; see also 37 Hen. VII, ch. 9, §§ 3, 4 (1545), reprinted in 3 STAT.
OF REALM, supra at 996 (a limit of 10 percent per annum interest), repealed by, 5 & 6 Edw. VL ch. 20, § 1 (1552),
reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 155; see ROBERT ASHTON, THE CROWN AND THE MONEY MARKET 1603-
1640 4 (1960) (after 1571). But see Fratcher, supra note 69, at 540 (after 1623).
During the seventeenth century Parliament continually lowered the maximum rate. See 13 Anne, ch.
15 (1713), reprinted in 11 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 928 (a limit of 5 percent per annum interest); 12 Chas. 2, ch.
13 (1660), reprinted in 5 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 236 (a limit of 6 percent per annum interest); 21 Jas. I, ch. 17,
§ 2 (1623), reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 1223, 1224 (a limit of 8 percent per annum interest), made
permanent by, 3 Chas. L, ch. 5, § 1 (1627), reprinted in 5 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 27.
73. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 38, at 390-91. Wager of law was a method of fact finding, relying upon
usually twelve citizens, eventually hired, who swore the defendant debtor was telling the truth when he denied
owing the debt. See id at 115-16. The theory in the Middle Ages was that religious fear of lying would deter false
swearing. See id.
74. See ANGELACONYERS, WiLTSHIRE EXTENTS FOR DEBTS: EDWARD I-ELIrABETHI 10 (1973) (when the
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of course allowed debtor possession of the collateral."5 The priority of the interest
against personalty dated from the date the creditor obtained an execution writ prior
to making the loan.76 The creditor would deliver the execution writ to the sheriff for
levy much later, only if the debt went unpaid.77
After 1500 a conditional sale prior to entry of the collusive judgment would have
priority, but it lacked the speedy enforcement by levy upon default enjoyed by the
collusive judgment. So a creditor with a choice of creating a collusive judgment or
a nonpossessory secured transaction would opt for a collusive judgment.
The collusive judgment received statutory sanction, along with the creditor rights
to levy on land and to imprison the debtor to force payment. The Statute of Acton
Burnell in 1283 provided for the enrollment of mercantile debts in the principle
towns in addition to the king's courts.7" The Second Statute of Westminister in 1285
writ was issued soon after the recognizance, no money was actually advanced until judgment had been accorded
the creditor; it was in the creditor's interest to specify an early date for repayment to keep the loan as liquid as
possible); Pou.AcK & MAniAND, supra note 38, at 203-04 (as early as 1201); PLUCKNETT, supra note 38, at 391-
92.
The idea for recording debts may have come from the continent where such a practice was available to
tradesmen during Henry U's reign. See Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1919).
75. See Hazeltine, supra note 47, at 43-44,46-47 (1904) (mortgages with debtor retention developed from
the judicial execution statutes elegit, merchant, and staple of the thirteenth century, making land available for levy).
See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of these judicial execution statutes.
76. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Brocket, Cro. Jac. 449, 79 Eng. Rep. 384 (K.B. 1618) (recognizance against
personalty binds from date the execution writ is awarded); Boucher v. Wiseman, Cro. Eliz. 440, 78 Eng. Rep. 680
(C.P. 1595) (nothing can stop execution against personalty after the date of the writ of execution); Anon., Cro. Eliz.
174, 78 Eng. Rep. 431 (Q.B. 1590) (writ offierifacias, the execution writ against personalty, defeats purchase after
its date but before levy). See also BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 420 (1st ed. 1771)(1967) (writ of extendifacias, the execution writ for the collusive judgment binds personalty, from its date); 3
SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHAIT A.D. 1251-1779 (Hubert Hall ed., 1932); Francis, supra note
29, at 827-29 (1986) (suggesting one to nine year delays). But see ABRAHAM CLARK FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF EXECUrIONS IN CIVIL CASES AND OF PROCEEDINGS IN AID AND RESTRAINT THEREOF 296 (1882) (writ
offierifacias from its teste, which could be the first day of term long anterior to issurance of the writ and the actual
rendition of the judgment); Daley v. Perry, 9 Yerg. 442 (Tenn. 1836) (the rule in Tennessee differs from that of
common law England); Johnson v. Ball, I Yerg. 291 (Tenn. 1830) (day of judgment is the day of award for writ
of execution).
77. See John Romain Rood, Attachments, Garnishments, and Executions, in 10 AMERICAN LAW AND
PROCEDURE 416 (James Parker Hall ed., 1915) (the evil was to take out execution as security with no intention of
delivering to the sheriff).
78. 11 Edw. 1 (1283), reprinted in I STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 53. Originally the towns were
London, York, and Bristol, with Salisbury added in 1351. See CONYERS, supra note 74, at 1.
Foreign merchants, who operated by selling to local English merchants on credit, desired the same sort
of summary procedures, ease of proof and drastic executions available for the enrolled deed, for their transactions
without the, for them, costly delay of waiting for the periodic sessions of the king's court. The complaint of the local
merchants was that many foreign merchants refused to trade in England because their fellows had suffered great
losses by advancing goods on credit and were unable to recover their debts since no speedy execution law existed.
These complaining merchants procured passage of the Statute of Acton Burnell. See 2 W.F. FINLASON, REEVES'
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW FROM THE TIME OF THE ROMANS TO THE END OF THE REIGN OF ELIZABErH 452-54
(1880); Levinthal, supra note 74, at 7.
The Statute of Acton Bumell, based on an earlier French system, PLUCKNETT, supra note 38, at 392 n.3,
provided that a merchant to ensure his debt must bring his debtor before the mayor of London, York, or Bristol or
before the mayor and a clerk appointed by the king to acknowledge the debt and day of payment. The clerk would
enter the recognizance on a roll and prepare a deed sealed by the debtor along with the king's seal. If the debtor
defaulted, the creditor must apply to the mayor, who upon review of the deed and recognizance would cause the
goods and devisable burgages (leased borough tenements) of the debtor appraised and sold in the amount of the
debt or, if no buyers came forward, would deliver the goods to the merchant. ff the debtor had no goods within the
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extended the procedure to include levy against land, unavailable for other
judgments.79 The Statute of Merchants in 1285 enforced statute merchants through
debtor's prisons."0 The Statute of Staples in 1353 extended the enrollment of
mercantile debts to the staple towns.[8"] Creditors could apply all three of these
statutory judicial liens to collateral that remained in possession of the debtor. 2 And
mayor's jurisdiction, the mayor would send the recognizance to the Chancellor for a writ directing the appropriate
sheriff to act as the mayor. If the debtor had no goods then he was imprisoned until he or his friends had settled
with the creditor for the debt and creditor costs spent sustaining the debtor in jail with bread and water and, if a
foreign merchant, cost spent attending to his English stay.
79. See 13 Edw. L st. 1. ch. 18 (1285). reprinted in I STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 45 (scirefacias)
& 82 (elegit), reprinted in I STAT. OF REALM, supra at 93; PLUCKNETr, supra note 38, at 392.
The Second Statute of Westminister expanded the property available for levy, making land available
to both local and foreign merchants. It authorized the writ offierifacias directing the sheriff to satisfy a judgment
by selling the debtors lands and goods and the writ of elegit directing the sheriff to satisfy a judgment by delivering
to the creditor all the debtor's goods and half the debtor's lands. It also provided that enrolled collusive judgments
would not admit of further court action and a writ of execution would issue anytime within a year of record.
80. See 3 Edw. I, st. 3, ch. 1 (1285), reprinted in 1 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 98; FINIASON, supra
note 78, at 454. The Statute of Merchants applied only to merchants. 5 Edw. I, ch. 33 (1311), reprinted in I STAT.
OF REALM, supra at 165 (so clarifying the prior statute); Levinthal, supra note 74, at 8.
The Statute of Merchants corrected the defects in the Statute of Acton Burnell. To remove too much
discretion in sheriffs, see PLUCKNETr, supra note 38, at 392, the creditor could take the recognizance before more
local officials, namely the mayor of London, a chief warden of a city or other town appointed by the king, or other
men chosen when the mayor and chief warden could not perform, and before clerks appointed by the king. To
remove delays the statute provided for additional recordings and imprisonment of the debtor as a first resort.
Recognizances and sealed writings both had two filings, one with the mayor or chief warden, the other with the
clerk. Upon default the mayor had the debtor imprisoned. The debtor within three months was to sell his goods and
lands to satisfy the debt, and if the debtor failed, the debtor's goods were delivered to the creditor for sale along with
a lease of the debtor's lands until the profits from the land satisfied the debt. See id
81. See 27 Edw. Ill, st. 2, ch. 9 (1353), reprinted in I STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 337; 11 Hen. VI,
ch. 10 (1433), reprinted in 2 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 285 (requiring a surety made to the Crown to prevent
debtor practice of countersuit to escape imprisonment on a staple statute); 23 Hen. VHII, ch. 6 (1532), reprinted
in 3 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 372 (authorizing Staple recognizances before the King's Bench and Court of
Common Pleas to eliminate practice of non-merchants using staple statutes); see also FINIASON, supra note 78,
at 381.
The Statute of Staples provided protection similar to the Statute of Merchants, but for mercantile debts
of export merchants at the staple towns, who procured passage of the statute to promote commerce. See Levinthal,
supra note 74, at 9. The English believed that by confining the export trade to certain towns where foreigners would
buy and by prohibiting Englishmen to export singly, they would bring more wealth to England than did English
trade singly on the Continent. See FINIASON, supra at 134. The staple exports were wool, wool bearing skins,
leather, and lead. See id at 135. The staple towns were Newcastle-upon-Tyne, York, Lincoln, Norwich,
Westminister, Canterbury, Chicester, Winchester, Exeter, Bristol, Kaemerdyn in Wales, and Dublin, Waterford,
Cork, and Drogheda in Ireland. See idL The Statute of Staples was reduced to recovery for small debts in 1532. See
23 Hen. VIII, ch. 6 (1532), reprinted in 3 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 372; WJ. JONES, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
ENGLISH BANKRUFrCY: STATUTES AND COMMISSIONS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD 15 (1979); see also Audley
v. Halsey, Cro. Car. 148, 79 Eng. Rep. 731 (K.B. 1629) (debt secured by statute staple on merchandize).
82. See HAZELTINE, supra note 47, at 44. Although some writers refer to the statutory liens when used on
personalty as security interests in personalty, see, e.g., id., modem thinkers distinguish between a secured
transaction and a judicial lien. See U.C.C. § 9-301.
During the era of collusive judgments, creditors could only levy on property in possesion of the debtor
at the time of enrollment and not after-acquired property. See CONYERS, supra note 74, at 2 (land held on the day
of recognizance under Statute of Merchants), 6 (land held on day of judgment under the writ of elegit, the writ to
seize lands rather than burgages permitted after 1285, not date of recognizance as under Statute of Staples), 12
(land held at time of recognizance, not levy), 13 (land at time of recognizance under Statute of Staples, describing
ascertainment problems when levy occurred years later), 14 (presumedly same rule for goods). Later, jurists
developed a claim that collusive judgments included after-acquired property on the basis of dicta in a 1537
yearbook case. See Colhoun v. Snider, 15 Pa. (6 Binn.) 135, 139-42 (laying out the support for inclusion of after-
acquired property and explaining the error of the conclusion); KENT, supra note 68, at 436 (describing the English
common law rle as including after-acquired property).
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in 1362 Parliament made all these merchant securities available for all debts, not
just mercantile debts. 3 Many classes of society began to use collusive judgments
extensively for a variety of different transactions, both commercial and non-
commercial. 4
The use of the collusive judgment as an alternative security device survived until
the eighteenth century. 5 The Statute of Frauds in 1677 destroyed the priority of the
collusive judgment.8 6 The Statute of Frauds provided that the priority date for the
collusive judgment would become the date of delivery of the writ of execution to
the sheriff for execution. 7 This priority date, effective after 1677, would allow
priority for a transfer by a sale, such as by a conditional deed or sale for a
83. See 36 Edw. I, Stat. 1, c.7 (1362), reprinted in I STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 373; HAZELTINE,
supra note 47, at 43-44.
84. See CONYERS, supra note 74, at 7-8 (merchants constituted only a one-third of all the creditors and
slightly less of all debtors, with professional men, churchmen, and knights serving as creditors and with peers and
knights as debtors), at 9-11 (trade debts represented only one-fifth of all debts, with family arrangements and
guarantees well represented).
85. See HAZELTINE supra note 47, at 30 (statute merchants); Francis, supra note 29, at 829 (averaged 250
entries per year in 1640 and only 20 per year by 1740 on the King's Bench's and Common Pleas's rolls).
86. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at 160 (describing the Statute of Frauds innovation only with
conditional estates created by collusive judgments); id. at 420 (describing the Statute of Frauds innovation only
with the writ of extendifacias, the execution writ for the collusive judgment). But see Francis, supra note 29, at
829 (crediting the demise of the collusive judgment to the appearance of warrants of attorney). Warrants of
attorney, allowing the creditor to obtain a confessed judgment upon default without the appearance of the debtor,
more likely became common shortly after 1677 to mimic the speedy levy of the previously effective collusivejudgment. But the warrant of attorney could not mimic the priority of the previously effective collusive judgment.
See infra note 88 and accompanying text. The kings's courts had rules concerning warrants of attorney by 1662.
See, e.g., Webb v. Aspinal, 7 Taunt. 701, 129 Eng. Rep. 279 n.a (citing Rules of Court, Hil. Term. 14 & 15 Car.
11 (1662)). See also BLACKSTONE, supra at 397.
87. See 29 Car. IL ch. 3, § 16 (1677), reprinted in 5 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 839, 841.
The middle American states and several southern states adopted versions of this section of the Statute
of Frauds. For validity at delivery, see 1788 DEL. LAWS, reprinted in I DELAWARE, LAWS OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE FROM THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER, ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED, TO THE EIGHTEENTH
DAY OF AUGUST, ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN 924, 926 (Samuel & John Adams eds.,
1797), ch. 178, § 4; 1799 N.J. Laws, ch. 772, § 4, p. 483; 1787 N.Y. Laws, ch. 56, p. 467, 468; 1772 Pa. Laws,
ch. 669, p. 389, 390; 1792 Va. Laws, ch. 5, § 12, p. 13, 16; Amott v. Nichols, I Harr. & J. 471 (Md. 1804) (quoting
29 Car. IL ch. 3, § 16); see also 1789 S.C. Laws, § 26, p. 20, 24 (decedent debt priority). Maryland in 1720 adopted
the General Statutes of England, which would include the 1677 Statute of Frauds. See ELUZABETH GASPAR BROWN,
BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836 96 (1964).
The New England states effectively opted for priority at levy. See CONN. REV. STAT., tit. 2, § 73, p. 35,
55 (1821) (levy within 60 days), confirmed by Allyn v. Burbank, 9 Conn. 151 (1882) (overplus to other judgment
liens); ME. REV. STAT., ch. 60, § 3, p. 219, 220-21 (1821) (levy within 3 months), confirmed by ME. REV. STAT.,
ch. 60, § 20 (1821) (overplus to otherjudgment liens in order of time); 1784 Mass. Laws ch. 33, p. 113 (levy within
3 months), confirmed by 1804 Mass. Laws ch. 83, § 6, p. 591, 595 (overplus to other judgment liens in order of
time); N.H. REV. STAT., ch. n.s., p. 79-80 (1792) (form of writ of execution) (next court term, usually 3 months),
confirmed by 1822 N.H. Laws, ch. 59, § 7, p. 7, 9 (overplus to other judgments liens in order of time for equity of
redemption); Rogers v. Edmunds, 6 N.H. 70 (1832) (first delivered if levied promptly); 1779 Verm. Laws, ch. n.s.,
p. 139 (levy within 60 days), confirmed by 1817 Verm. Laws, ch. 119. p. 102 (priority for personalty in hands of
the sheriff).
North Carolina and Georgia, in contrast, followed the old common law rule or dated priority even earlier.
See 1822 Ga. Laws, p. 55 (binds all property from date of judgment); Ingles v. Donalson, 3 N.C. 57 (1798).
Efforts to circumvent the delivery role by staying the sheriff failed. See, e.g., Matthew v. Warne, 11 N.J.
Law 295, 305, 312 (1830) (creditors' practice in New Jersey ordered the sheriff to stay execution writ; condemning
the practice as fraud and awarding priority to a subsequent execution writ that levied); Storm v. Woods, 11 Johns.
110 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1814) (stay order to sheriff waives priority); Eberle v. Mayer, 9 Pa. (1 Rawle) 33 (1829) (stay
order to sheriff waives priority). So in England priority effectively depended on the date of levy after 1743. See
Bradley v. Wyndham, 1 Wils. 44,95 Eng. Rep. 483 (K.B. 1743).
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nonpossessory secured transaction, anytime between entry of the collusive judgment
at court with issuance of the execution writ and delivery of the writ of execution to
the sheriff for execution. When creating a security interest and to enjoy the priority
previously accorded the collusive judgment, the creditor now had to use a chattel
mortgage or conditional sale. The drawback of this new procedure involved the
absence of speedy levy for a recalcitrant debtor, partially overcome if used in
conjunction with a warrant of attorney.88
Francis North, 9 a member of the landed aristocracy,' crafted this part of the
Statute of Frauds,9 to protect good faith purchasers, including mortgagees under
conditional deeds and sales, from liens they could not know about, namely those
arising from back-dating a judgment against realty from the date of judgment to the
first day of term, which the common law rule allowed, and from withholding the
execution writ against personalty until the debtor's default, if ever, the practice
under the collusive judgment. In an era when landed estate-holders needed to sell
family treasure, standing timber, and land to payoff debts from extravagant living
after 1650,' North could no longer permit these common law rules, designed to
prevent fraudulent sales after filing of the lawsuit to defeat execution,93 to interfere
with the orderly disposal of estates and valuable personalty.
Because of these two reasons, a need for an interest substitute and the priority of
collusive judgments, nonpossessory security interests even in realty did not appear
until the early seventeenth century concurrent with the disincentive for the pledge.
They did not become common until the late seventeenth century concurrent with the
disincentive for the collusive judgment.
88. The northern states authorized warrants of attorney by statute for small debts only as a mechanism to
reduce the debtor's litigation costs for collections. See, e.g., CONN. REV. STAT. tit. 21, § 33, p. 146-47 (1821)
(required debtor's appearance and available only for debts under $70); Me. Rev. Laws, ch. 77, p. 270 (1821)
(required debtor's appearance and writ of execution within three years of default); 1782 Mass. Laws, ch. 21, p. 170
(Sept. ch. 4) (required debtor's appearance and writ of execution within three years of default); 1808 N.H. Laws,
ch. n.s.. p. 24 (required debtor's appearance, debt under $200, and writ of execution with stay); 1798 N.J. Laws,
ch. 718, p. 3 5 0 (on warrant of attorney for confession); 1801 N.Y. Laws, ch. 32, p. 4 9 (on warrant of attorney for
confession); 1806 Pa. Laws, ch. 122, § 28, p. 348 (on warrant of attorney for confession and writ of execution with
stay); 1782 Venr. Laws, ch. n.s., p. 112 (§ 11 of act regulating process in civil actions: required debtor's
appearance and available only for debt under 200 pounds). The American creditors obtained quick judgments, then
awaited default to obtain the execution writ. See, e.g., Averill v. Loucka, 6 Barb. 20 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1849) (warrant
of attorney on July 1, 1846, judgment on July I1, 1846, and execution writ two years later on October 19, 1848).
Rhode Island used bank process contained in the bank's statutory charter with an immediate execution writ issued
upon default, obviating the need for a bank to obtain a judgment to collect on a debt due the bank. See History of
the Rhode Island Bank Process and the Terrible Works of the General Assembly in Connection with It, in 22 BOOK
NOTES CONSISTING OF LIrERARY GosSip, CRmcIIsMs OF BOOK AND LOCAL HISTORICAL MATTERS CONNECrED
wrrH RHODE ISLAND 76-77 (Sidney S. Rider ed., 1905). See supra note 86 for warrants of attorney.
89. See 4 JOHN LORD CAMPBEIL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL
OF ENGLAND 280-337 (1868) (life of Lord Guilford). Francis North (1637-1685) served as Solicitor-General (1671-
1673), Attorney-General (1673-1675), Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (1675-1682), and as Lord Chancellor
(1682-83), and in 1683 became Baron Guilford.
90. See id at 280 (second son of a Baron), 283 (steward on several family manors), 294 (married the heiress
of Earl of Downe).
91. See 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 384; Crawford D. Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute
of Frauds (29 Car. llc.3) and Their Authors, 61 U. PENN. L REV. 284,315 (1913).
92. See JOHN HABAKKUK, MARRIAGE, DEET AND THE ESTATES SYSTEM: ENGUSH LANDowNERsHIP 1650-
1950 277 (landed families incurred debt to lead lives of luxury and grandeur), 304-05, 330 (landed families
liquidated debt by sale of assets), 361 (landed families rarely sold land except to liquidate debts).
93. See Rood, supra note 77, at 415 (1994).
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Edward Coke, an eminent early seventeenth century English jurist, did not know
of the mortgage without creditor possession of the realty.94 Coke, one of the most
influential reporters of Tudor-Stuart legal opinions, reported in thirteen volumes
cases from 1572 to 1616, begun in 1600."5 Coke's influence stemmed from his
attempt to restate English law, first through his Reports and second through his
Institutes, a four-part treatise commenting on Littleton's Tenures, the principle
statutes, the criminal law, and the jurisdiction and history of the courts.'
Coke's knowledge paralleled commercial practice. During the early Stuart
Period, lenders made private loans two ways.' These private bankers lent unsecured
on the basis of reputation through discounted purchases of bills of exchange for
short-term lending and through penal bonds far in excess of the principle amount
for long-term lending. Frequently they also required reputable guarantors on the
bills of exchange and bonds. These loans had little value unless the borrower or
guarantor possessed substantial wealth. Secondly, these bankers lent secured on the
basis of pledges, both of realty and personalty of every conceivable type from
jewels to clothing.
Historians of realty law record the earliest mention of a mortgage with debtor
possession of the collateralized realty as in 15779" and suggest that the technique
did not become established until the Restoration.99 These historians offered no
explanation for the timing of the origin of the mortgage with debtor possession.
They inferred the rise would not have occurred without the much earlier
development of the equity of redemption as a remedy in the fifteenth and sixteenth
century by the Chancery Court,"° which made possible the shift in possession.'°1
They also suggested the collusive judgment statutes conditioned parties to debtor
possession." z This article makes it clear the nonpossessory security interests in real
94. See R.W. TURNER, EQurrY OF REDEMPTION: ITS NATURE, HISTORY, AND CONNECTIONS wTrH
EQUIrABLE ESTATES GENERALLY 89 (William W. Gaunt & Co. 1986) (1931).
95. See PLUCKNETr. supra note 38, at 280-81. Edward Coke (1552-1634) served as Attomey-General (1601
to 1606), Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas (1606 to 1613), Chief Justice of the King's Bench (1613 to
1616), and after 1621 Parliamentary leader in opposition to the Crown. See id., at 243-44.
96. See id. at 282.
97. See ASHTON, supra note 72, at 2-9.
98. See Hales v. Hales, 1 Ch. Rep. 105, 21 Eng. Rep. 520 (1636) (mortgagor "enjoyed the premises for 60
years last past"); TURNER, supra note 94, at 89-91; Sibson v. Fletcher, I Ch. Rep. 59, 21 Eng. Rep. 507 (1632)
(1616 mortgage with mortgagor possession from the making); Powsley v. Blackman, Cro. Jac. 659, 79 Eng. Rep.
569 (K.B. 1620) (conditional deed of 1612 with proviso that mortgagee will not interfere with mortgagor's
possession; mortgagor is a tenant at will); see also Stone v. Grubham, 2 Bulst. 225, 80 Eng. Rep. 1079 (KB. 1615)
(suggesting mortgagee possession is not necessary to enforcement of a mortgage).
99. See PLucKNErT, supra note 38, at 607-08 (possession by the debtor under a mortgage did not become
established until the middle of the seventeenth century); TURNER, supra note 94, at 89-91 (developed by the end
of the sixteenth century, with the first case being Winnington's Case in 1598, but most reported cases during the
English Civil War still have the mortgagee in possession); see also Pilkington v. Winnington, 2 Co. Rep. 59a, 76
Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B. 1598) (conditional deed of 1559, not used for security, upheld); ORLANDO BRIDGMAN,
CONVEYANCES BEING SELECT PRECEDENTS OF DEEDS AND INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING THE MOST CONSIDERABLE
ESTATES IN ENGLAND 298 (3d ed. 1699) (form of vendor's mortgage with provision for mortgagor to yield up
possession with defeasance).
100. See KIRALFY, supra note 7, at 623 (fifteenth century); 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 293 (citing
Y.B. 9 Ed. N. Trin. pl. 34 (1456), claiming it was not a true equity of redemption because the basis of jurisdiction
was obscure) & 329 (citing Sedgwick v. Evan, Ch. Cas. 167, 21 Eng. Rep. 97 (1583)).
101. See OSBORNE, supra note 69, at 10. But see TURNER, supra note 94, at 89-91 (vice versa).
102. See supra note 75.
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estate should not appear until the ending of the interest prohibition in 1571 and not
become common until after the Statute of Frauds in 1677, the observed pattern.
Even in the mid-seventeenth century the majority of the reported opinions
recorded the creditor in possession of the realty. 3 Land banks still lent on the basis
of the pledge of land in the late seventeenth century."°' During that era the
mortgagor created the security interest by granting title to the mortgagee'05
generally through one of two forms: (1) a grant with a covenant to reconvey upon
payment or (2) a grant with a condition of defeasance upon payment.'06
The development of the nonpossessory secured transaction occurred even later,
at the end of the seventeenth century. 0 7 The most popular security device in the
early Stuart Period still remained the collusive judgment."°  Private bankers still lent
on the basis of the pledge of goods in the mid-seventeenth century.' 09 And merchant
lenders frequently neglected to take any security interest or lent on general
reputation in order to find business." ° The nonpossessory secured transaction also
103. See TURNER, supra note 94, at 89-91 (during the English Civil War); see also Turner v. Crane, 2 Ch.
Rep. 241, 21 Eng. Rep. 668 (1682) (mortgagee possession); Hodgkins v. Lutwyck, 2 Freem. 70, 23 Eng. Rep. 1064
(Ch1. 1681) (same); Anon., 2 Freem. 60,23 Eng. Rep. 1058 (Ch. 1680) (same); Smith v. Valence, I Ch. Rep. 169,
21 Eng. Rep. 540 (1655) (same); Isham v. Cole, 1 Ch. Rep. 127, 21 Eng. Rep. 527 (1639) (1605 mortgage with
mortgagee possession); Porter v. Hubbert, 2 Ch. Rep. 85, 21 Eng. Rep. 623 (1672) (1636 mortgage with mortgagee
possession possibly by reason of default); Fleming v. Taylor, I Ch. Rep. 249, 21 Eng. Rep. 563 (1664) (1643
mortgage with mortgagee possession possibly by reason of default); Saunders v. Hard, 1 Ch. Rep. 184, 21 Eng.
Rep. 544 (1660) (1595 mortgage with mortgagee possession possibly by reason of default); Comel v. Sykes, 1 Ch.
Rep. 193, 21 Eng. Rep. 547 (1660) (1635 mortgage with mortgagee possession possibly by reason of default). But
see Chapman v. Tanner, 1 Vein. 267, 23 Eng. Rep. 461 (Ch. 1684) (mortgagor possession); Anon., 2 Ch. Cas. 242,
22 Eng. Rep. 927 (1678) (same); Righton v. Overton, 2 Freem. 20, 22 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ch. 1677) (same); Bedell
v. Bedell, Rep. Temp. Finch 5, 23 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ch. 1673) (same).
104. See J. KErrH HORSEFIELD, BRmSH MONETARY EXPERItENrS 1650-1710 159 (1983) (1691 land bank
based on pledged rents and pledged land).
105. See Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 165, 170,26 Eng. Rep. 107, 110, sub nonm Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves. Sen. 348,
361, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1082 (Ch. 1750) (mortgagee of personalty is the owner); see also Ratcliffe v. Davis, Yelv.
178, 80 Eng. Rep. 118 (IKB. 1611) (ownership continues in pledgor for a pledge).
106. See BRMMAN, supra note 99, at 96 (form of mortgage to be void upon repayment), 226 (form of
mortgage with condition of redemption); see also PLucKNErr, supra note 38, at 607.
Another form of mortgage was a grant and a regrant, leaving the debtor in possession. See BRiDGMAN,
supra at 104 (form of mortgage by demise and redemise).
107. See Bucknal v. Roiston, Prec. Ch. 285,24 Eng. Rep. 136, sub non. Anon., 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 479,22 Eng.
Rep. 407 (Ch. 1709); Cole v. Davis, 1 Ld. Raym. 724,91 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1698); Meggot v. Mills, 12 Mod.
159, 88 Eng. Rep. 1234, 1 Ld. Raym. 286, 91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697); see also Ryall, I Atk. at 185, 26 Eng.
Rep. at 120, 1 Ves. Sen. at 374, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1090 (Ch. 1749) (LC. Hardwicke in 1750: nonpossessory secured
transaction developed long after 1624 Bankruptcy Statute).
For an earlier colonial American instance in 1682, see infra note 200 and accompanying text.
Prior to 1697 the practice was to deliver the personalty to the mortgagee. See, e.g., Newton v. Langham,
2 Ch. Rep. 108, 21 Eng. Rep. 630 (1675) (1660 mortgage of an interest in the East India Company).
108. See JONES, supra note 81, at 9.
109. See R.D. RICHARDS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF BANKING IN ENGLAND 31-32 (Edward Backwell, private
banker to Charles 11, was a big pawnbroker), 99 (1659: bank proposal to lend on pawns of goods and land), 100
(1665: bank proposal to lend on pawns), 101 (1674: bank proposal to lend on security of goods and coin deposited),
103 (1662: bank proposal to lend on plate, jewels, cloth, wool, silk, leather, linen, and metals deposited), 110
(1682: Bank of City of London lent on deposit of merchandise and goods), 172 (1694: Bank of England lent on
pawns of coffee, tin, iron, copper, and jewels as security for loans), 210 (1650s: private bankers lent on coin and
plate deposited), 233 (1683: foundation of credit is goods received, stored and preserved in bank) (1929).
110. See Richard Grassley, The Rate of Profit in Seventeenth Century England. ENG. HIST. REV. 721,742
(1969) (on general credit); JONES, supra note 81, at 51 (fail to obtain).
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developed with forms similar to mortgages, as grants with a covenant to reconvey
or with conditions defeasance."'
11. THE FOUR ENGLISH RULES
In eighteenth century England, the newly developed security device, the
nonpossessory secured transaction, faced attack from three statutes when challenged
by third parties, the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute and the Bankruptcy
Statutes of 1604 and 1624. Decisions rendered under these statutes enunciated four
rules, two under fraudulent conveyance law and two under the bankruptcy law.
Only one was the per se fraud rule advanced by the fraudulent theorists. It applied
only in a bankruptcy proceeding for merchant-debtors. Under the other three rules,
English courts often upheld the validity of the nonpossessory secured transaction
when challenged by third parties.
A. The Fraudulent Conveyance Law
The collusive judgment statutes prompted debtors to develop evasive techniques
to avoid the imprisonment permitted by those statutes. Overburdened debtors in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries frequently transferred all their lands and goods
to their friends in trust for use of the grantor through fictitious sales, fled to one of
the numerous sanctuaries where the king's courts' power did not govern, lived
luxuriously from the income of the property transferred until the creditor accepted
payment of a small portion of the debt and released the remainder, then returned,
and had back their property."
2
Creditors procured passage of the second series of statutes to deter this debtor
relief. In 1377 Parliament passed a statute rendering such collusive land transfers
followed by sanctuary flight void and hence liable to execution by creditors." By
1488 debtors instead gave their assets to friends and did not run to sanctuaries but
remained." 4 So in 1488 Parliament extended this creditor protection to chattels by
making all transfers of chattels in trust for use of the grantor, collusive or not, void
with respect to strangers prejudiced by such transfer but not between the parties
themselves." 5 Parliament extended these statutes in 1571 to cover all assignments,
whether for value or not, made with the intent to defraud or delay creditors:
For the avoyding and abolysshing . . . Gyftes Grauntes Alienations
Conveyaunces ... Wth ... Intent to delaye hynder or defraude Creditors
... Bee yt therefore declared... every Gyfte Graunte Alienation Bargayne and
Conveyaunce of Landes... Goodes and Catalls ... made... for any Intent or
111. See Batemen v. Elnan, Cro. Eliz. 866, 78 Eng. Rep. 1083 (Ex. 1597) (pledge of personalty in 1594 with
condition defeasance).
112. See Israel Treiman, Escaping the Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 LQ. REV. 230, 235-36 (1927);
FINLASON, supra note 78, at 142-43; MELvILLE MADiSON BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
11-12(1911).
113. See 50 Edw. I, ch. 6 (1377), reprinted in 1 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 398.
114. See GLENN, supra note 13, at 85 (describing such an act to defeat a writ of fieri facias in 1462; citing
I Paston's Letters, Everyman's library, 228-29).
115. See 3 Hen. VII, c.4 (1488), reprinted in 3 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 512 (an Acte agaynst
fraudulent deeds of gyft); FINLASON, supra note 78, at 193-94; see also Pauncefoot's Case (Ex. 1593), reported
in Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 82a, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 816 (Star Chamber 1601) (fled overseas).
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Purpose before declared and expressed, shalbe from henceforth deemed and
taken onely as againste that pson... to be clearly and utterly voyde frustrate and
of none Effecte .... " 6
Parliament passed this 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute as a revenue
measure." 7 The statute prevented those under a threat of forfeiting their personalty
to the Crown through a bill of attainder from thwarting the forfeiture by conveying
the personalty to heirs. A conviction under the statute resulted in imprisonment and
forfeiture of the property, one-half to the Crown and one-half to the injured
creditors." 8 But English courts quickly shaped this statute to creditors' needs. Upon
the statute's passage, these courts voided fraudulent conveyances because of the
statute to allow creditors to levy on the debtor's transferred property without a
criminal prosecution." 9
1. The Absolute-Conditional Rule
In 1615 Coke delineated the absolute-conditional rule. Stone v. Grubham"°
involved a third-party attack under the Fraudulent Conveyance Statute against a sale
of a real estate lease and goods by deed of gift contingent upon the payment of a
sum of money. The seller retained possession of the lease and goods. Coke upheld
the transaction. If the transaction documents indicate an absolute sale, one without
any conditions, but the parties permit seller retention of possession, the court will
find the transaction a fraudulent conveyance and will not enforce it against
adversely affected third parties. But if the transaction documents indicate a
conditional sale, one contingent upon some event, and if the seller's retention of
possession is consistent with the conditions, then the court will enforce it against
adversely affected third parties.
Coke's formulation of the rule anticipated use of written documentation by the
parties.'' Commercial transactions in the king's courts generally involved written
contracts before the eighteenth century."n Under the absolute-conditional rule all
opinions prior to the appearance of the rebuttable rule involved written
documentation to create the nonpossessory secured transaction. 23
116. Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 1571, 13 Eliz. 1, ch. 5, § I [hereinafter Fraudulent Conveyance Act],
reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 537, reenacted, 14 Eliz. , ch. 11, § 1 (1572), reprinted in 4 STAT.
OF REALM, supra at 602, made perpetual, 29 Eliz. L ch. 5, § 1(1587), reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at
709; see Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 1585, 27 Eliz. 1, ch. 4, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 769
(extending the Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 1571 to purchasers), made perpetual, 39 Eliz. I, ch. 18, § 3 (1588),
reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 916. See generally KIRALFY, supra note 7, at 550.
117. See I GLENN, supra note 13, at 86-92 (citing SIR SIMON D'EwEs, COMPLErE JOURNAL OF THE VOTES,
SPEECHES AND DEBATES, BOTH OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND HOUSE OF COMMONS, THROUGH THE REIGN OF
QUEEN EuZABETH OF GLORIOUS MEMORIES (1682, 1693)).
118. See Fraudulent Conveyance Act, § 2, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 537, 538.
119. See Mannocke's Case, 3 Dyer 295a, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (C.P. 1572) (creditor recovered retained profits
from land under a writ of elegit).
120. 2 Bulst. 225, 226, 80 Eng. Rep. 1079, 1080, 1 Roll. Rep. 3, 81 Eng. Rep. 285 (K.B. 1615) (probably
in defeasance form).
121. See SAMUEL WILISTON, THE LAW GOVERNiNoG SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE
UNIFORM SALES ACT 567 (1909) (for absolute-conditional rule must have a document).
122. See FuRMSTON, supra note 59, at 9.
123. See Stone v. Grubham, 2 Bulst. 225,80 Eng. Rep. 1079, 1 Roll. Rep. 3, 81 Eng. Rep. 285 (K-B. 1615)
(deed of gift); see also Oakover v. Pettus, Cas. Temp. Finch 270, 23 Eng. Rep. 148 (Ch. 1676) (settlement by deed
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Since Coke, a member of the landed aristocracy, developed the absolute-
conditional rule, it best suited the needs of the landed aristocracy of the seventeenth
century.'24 The landed aristocrats required formalities to deprive them of their
property.
The case advanced by fraudulent theorists for the per se fraud rule anticipated the
absolute-conditional rule. In Twyne's Case"5 a creditor owed the lesser sought a
judgment to permit the sheriff to seize the debtor's assets, predominately sheep, to
satisfy his debt. Twyne, the creditor owed the greater, obtained an absolute deed of
gift from the debtor for all the debtor's goods in return for cancellation of the debt
due Twyne. The debtor retained possession of the sheep, sold some, sheared some,
and marked them with his mark. When the sheriff came to levy on behalf of the
judgment creditor, Twyne resisted the sheriff by force since he owned the sheep.
The Star Chamber found that Twyne's transaction violated the 1571 Fraudulent
Conveyance Statute for several reasons, including the absence of any conditions in
the deed of gift authorizing the retained possession. So it convicted Twyne of
criminal fraud. Twyne's transaction did not come within the exception for transfers
made for valuable consideration and in good faith. 26 Twyne satisfied the first
requirement, but not the second since the documentation did not evidence the
arrangement. So Twyne offended, not in obtaining a preference nor leaving the
debtor in possession, but in lying about the transaction in the documentation.
The absolute-conditional rule involved both practical and moral principles. The
rule limited the jury's role. Under the rule a judge could determine the absoluteness
or conditions from the document as a question of law.'"' A jury only need determine
compliance with the conditions. The seventeenth century English courts faced juries
without adequate mechanisms of control. Medieval attaint became obsolete,
of trust); Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, sub nor. Chamberlain v. Twyne, Moo. K.B. 638, 72
Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601) (sale by deed of gift).
Subsequent English cases using the absolute-conditional rule for the nonpossessory secured transaction
also dealt with written documentation. See Edwards v. Harben, 2 Term. Rep. 587, 100 Eng. Rep. 315 (K.B. 1788)
(executed bill of sale); see also Brown v. Heathcote, 1 Atk. 160,26 Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch. 1746) (deed of assignment
in bankruptcy); Bourne v. Dodson, 1 Atk. 154, 26 Eng. Rep. 100 (Ch. 1740) (indenture of bargain and sale, in
bankruptcy).
124. See JONES, supra note 81, at 8-9 (Parliament controlled by landed aristocrats, including Lord Coke, who
assumed merchants lived in extravagance).
125. 3 Co. Rep. 80b-81b. 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 811-14. sub nonm Chamberlain v. Twyne, Moo. K.B. 638.72
Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601); see infta notes 127-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rational
behind the absolute-conditional rule.
126. See Fraudulent Conveyance Act, § 5, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 537, 538 ("this
Acte... shall not extend to any... Interest, in... Goodes or Catals ... conveyed... upon good Consyderation
& bona fide lawfully conveyed .... ").
127. See, e.g., Edwards v. Haxben, 2 Term. 587, 596, 100 Eng. Rep. 315, 321 (K.B. 1788) (jury
determination not required if only evidence is absolute sale and debtor possession of collateral); White v. Hussey,
Prec. Ch. 13, 24 Eng. Rep. 7, 8 (Ch. 1690) (same for mortgage of realty). See also ARTHUR BEn.BY PEARSON AND
HUGH FENWICK, BENJAMIN'S TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (1888) (the absolute-
conditional rule is a question of law for the judge). Compare Ryall v. Rowles, I Ves. Sen. 348, 354, 27 Eng. Rep.
1074, 1078 (Ch. 1750) (mortgagee's attorney's argument that under Stone and Bucknal debtor's possession under
a mortgage is not evidence of fraud), with id. at 359, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1081 (Judge Burnet's argument that all the
circumstances of the matter is for the jury). See also Stone v. Grubham, 2 Bulst. 225, 80 Eng. Rep. 1079, 1 Roll.
3, 81 Eng. Rep. 285 (K-B. 1615) (using the absolute-conditional rule for mortgage of lease and personalty);
Bucknall v. Roiston, Prec. Ch. 285, 24 Eng. Rep. 136, sub non Anon, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 479, 22 Eng. Rep. 407
(same for mortgage of goods, citing 40 trial court instances where fraud found solely from debtor's possession).
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motions for new trial for verdicts against the weight of the evidence had yet to
develop, and juries still decided from their own knowledge of the parties."I For the
issue of fraud by debtor possession, adequate parol evidence rules had yet to
develop.2 9 Parties to the lawsuit before the King's Bench or Common Pleas could
not testify." ° So in a battle between creditors over the debtor's collateral, the only
evidence often became a written document or the possibly suborned perjury of the
debtor. So the absolute-conditional rule removed the issue of fraud by debtor
possession from the jury by requiring written title documents.
Moreover, as long as the documentation faithfully described the true transaction
revealed by the parties' actions, it was honest and truthful.'' So the king's courts
would uphold the transaction even against adversely affected third parties. But
when the documentation failed to accurately describe the true transaction, the
parties committed a sin.'32
Although the absolute-conditional rule arose for sales, it applied to
nonpossessory secured transactions since they took the form of a sale subject to the
condition of defeasance or reconveyance' 3 But the earliest reported opinion
involving the nonpossessory secured transaction under the absolute-conditional rule
did not appear until the eighteenth century and then only in the Chancery. Since the
Chancery did not use a jury for fact determination, it continued to use the absolute-
conditional rule long after the common law courts abandoned it for the rebuttable
rule. In that early eighteenth century opinion, the Chancery upheld the
nonpossessory secured transaction under the absolute-conditional rule when
challenged by a third party for collateral difficult to deliver." 4 Consequently, one
128. See 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 56.
129. Two centuries later the parol evidence rule barred all but the title document under the absolute-
conditional rule. See Starrv. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817); Clark v. Richards, I Conn. 54 (1814).
130. See 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 388.
131. The medieval English lawyers allowed actions to speak for the transaction for proof purposes. See Kevin
M. Teeven, Problems of Proof and Early English Contract Law, 15 CAMBRIAN L REV. 52, 56 (1984) (completion
of performance provided proof of contractual agreement for lawsuit to receive payment in England during Middle
Ages).
132. For proscriptions against lies, see Exodus 20:16 (shall not bear false witness against your neighbor);
Colossians 3:9 (do not lie to one another).
133. See Stone v. Grubham, 2 Bulst. 225, 226, 80 Eng. Rep. 1079, 1080, 1 Roll. Rep. 3, 81 Eng. Rep. 285
(K.B. 1615) (suggesting the rule's use for pledges). But see Bethel v. Stanhope, Cm. Eliz. 810, 78 Eng. Rep. 1037,
1038 (C.P. 1600) (a conditional deed of gift of goods invalid as a fraudulent conveyance when the condition only
called for payment of twenty shillings for goods valued at two hundred fifty pounds sterling, made according to
the jury to defraud creditors).
134. See Bucknal v. Roiston, Prec. Ch. 285,285-86,24 Eng. Rep. 136, 136-37, sub nom Anon., 2 Eq. Cas.
Abr. 479, 22 Eng. Rep. 407 (Ch. 1709) (upholding against a judgment creditor a bill of sale as security for loan
to officer-debtor for his goods and proceeds on board ship about to sail to India for three years with debtor's right
to sell the goods and reinvest the proceeds in other goods for resale during the voyage). The Bucknal judgment
rested not on the difficulty of delivery but the specific wording of the documentation. See id. (the ship situation
resembles realty situation, which requires physical inspection of the deed, since there was a written document
corresponding to a realty deed, namely the conditional bill of sale, which on its very face created an obligation to
do as the parties did and defeated any notion of an intent to defraud creditors); see also Head v. Egerton, 3 P. Wins.
280, 24 Eng. Rep. 1065 (Ch. 1734) (mortgage of first mortgagee who did not endeavor to obtain title documents
from debtor is subsequent to second mortgagee since he was an accessory to inducing the second mortgagee to
lend); Peter v. Russell, 2 Vern. 726, 23 Eng. Rep. 1076 (Ch. 1716) (mortgage of first mortgagee, induced to lend
realty lease documentation to debtor, is subsequent to second mortgagee if first mortgagee knew of debtor's intent
to obtain further lending).
For the English at sea exception, see Atkinson v. Maling, 2 Term. 462, 100 Eng. Rep. 249 (KLB. 1788)
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late eighteenth century opinion described every nonpossessory secured transaction
case challenged by the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute as having followed the
absolute-conditional rule. 3 ' Moreover, when bankrupt assignees first challenged the
nonpossessory secured transaction under the bankruptcy statutes in the mid-
eighteenth century, they attacked the absolute-conditional rule.'36
2. The Rebuttable Rule
The 1677 Statute of Frauds caused the absence of opinions dealing with the
absolute-conditional rule for the nonpossessory secured transaction. English courts
replaced the absolute-conditional rule with the rebuttable rule due to this statute
before the nonpossessory secured transaction replaced the collusive judgment. The
1677 Statute of Frauds declared all sales of goods, which included the
nonpossessory secured transaction as a conditional deed or sale, involving more
than ten pounds sterling void unless evidenced by actual delivery, delivery of part,
earnest money given, or written documentation. 37 English decisions under this
statute eventually approved in addition, symbolic delivery such as delivery to an
agent, of a warehouse key, or of part on behalf of the whole.'
The northern United States evidenced this development. Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island failed to adopt the sale of goods provision of the 1677 Statute of Frauds. 39
Their courts used the absolute-conditional rule."4 In contrast Massachusetts, New
York, New Hampshire, and New Jersey adopted the sale of goods provision . 4'
(allowing the arrival exception in bankruptcy); Lampiere v. Pasley, 2 Term. 485, 100 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788)
(describing the arrival requirement); D'Wolf v. Harris, 8 F. Cas. 193, 4 Mas. 515 (describing how debtor's
possession is consistent with the mortgage) (Mass. C.C.D. 1827) (New York law), a.ffd, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 147
(1830); GEORGE CAINES, AN INQUIRY mTO THE LAW MERCHANT OF THE UNITED STATES, OR LEX MECATORIA
AMERICANA 527 (1802).
135. See, e.g., Edwards v. Harben, 2 Term. Rep. 587,595, 100 Eng. Rep. 315, 320 (KB. 1788) (many cases
on the subject of nonpossessory secured transactions and absolute-conditional rule universally followed in all
cases).
136. See, e.g., Ryall v. Rolle, 1 AtL 165, 170,26 Eng. Rep. 107, 110, sub non. Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves. Sen.
348, 361, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1082 (Ch. 1750) (the 1624 Bankruptcy Statute makes no distinction between
absolute and conditional sales).
See infra note 172 and accompanying text for Chancery's use of the absolute-conditional rule in
bankruptcy.
137. See Statute of Frauds of 1677, 29 Car. II, ch. 3, § 17, reprinted in 5 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at
839, 841.
138. See Chaplin v. Rogers, I East 192,102 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B. 1800) (part on behalf of whole); Cooper v.
Easton, 7 Term. Rep. 14, 101 Eng. Rep. 830 (K.B. 1796) (warehouse key); Sarle v. Keaves, 2 Esp. 598, 170 Eng.
Rep. 468 (N.C. 1798) (to an agent).
139. See 3 HENRY REED, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND OF OTHER LIKE
ENACTMENTS 1N FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE 330-31 (1884) (Statutes
of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island).
140. See Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (I Yeates) 3 (1791) (at sea exception to rule, secured party's
possession impossible until arrival, so deemed consistent with mortgage). Rhode Island had no reported opinions
before adoption of its chattel mortgage act.
141. See 1788 Mass. Laws, ch. 18, p. 712 (ten pounds); 1794 N.J. Laws, ch. 496, p. 942,947 ($30); 1792
N.H. Rev. Laws, ch. n.s., p. 241 (1791) (ten pounds); 1787 N.Y. Laws, ch. 44, p. 438,442 (ten pounds); George
Caines, supra note 134, at 376; see also 1693 Mass. Laws, ch. 15, reprinted in I MASSACHUSETrS GENERAL
COURT, THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OF THE PROVINCE PAST BY MASSACHUSETTS BAY 47
(1869), 1719 N.H. Laws, ch. 2, reprinted in 2 LAwS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 328 (Albert Stillman Batchelor ed.,
1904).
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Their courts used the rebuttable rule.142 Connecticut and Vermont adopted the sale
of goods provision after their written reports commenced. 43 Their courts used the
absolute-conditional rule before the adoption and the heightened rebuttable rule
after the adoption."
The southern states with permissive filing of chattel mortgages, South Carolina
and North Carolina, reflect the same bifurcation. Courts in North Carolina, without
the sale of goods provision used the absolute-conditional rule. Courts in South
Carolina, with the sale of goods provision, used the rebuttable rule."4
C.J. North drafted the sections of the Statute of Frauds dealing with written sale
of goods contracts as well as those treating delayed executions." North drafted the
sale of goods provision to prevent the landed aristocrats from being deprived of
their land and valuable personalty (valued over ten pounds sterling) by oral,
possibly perjured testimony in era when the courts had only begun the development
of devices to control juries, such as the parol evidence rule and the motions for new
trial for a verdict against the weight of the evidence. 47 North also favored and
drafted several proposals for a realty recording statute, all of which failed. 48
The newly emerging merchant aristocracy, 49 however, managed to craft the
rebuttable rule from the 1677 Statute of Frauds by 1690 for their needs. Although
the earliest pronouncement of the rebuttable rule appeared in the Chancery, 5° John
142. See, e.g., Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. 404 (1808); Haven v. Low, 2 N.H. 13 (1819); Hendricks v.
Mount, 5 N.J. Law 850 (1820); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. S. CL 1810).
143. See 1821 Conn. Laws, ch. 39, p. 246 ($35); 1823 Verm. Laws, ch. 4, p. 11 ($40); see also 13 JAMES
HAMMOND TRUMBULL, PUBuC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CoNNECTICUT 422 (1850) (Connecticut adopted a
Statute of Frauds in 1771 for certain transactions to be in writing, but omitted the sale of goods as one).
144. Compare Clark v. Richards, 1 Conn. 54 (1814) (absolute-conditional rule); Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Verm.
115 (1826) (absolute-conditional rule for pre-1823 case), with Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824) (heightened
rebuttable rule); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Verm. 423 (1830) (heightened rebuttable rule). See infra note 238 for the
heightened rebuttable rule.
145. See Gregory v. Perkins, 15 N.C. 50 (1830) (absolute-conditional rule); Gaither v. Mumford, 4 N.C. 600
(1817) (same); Ingles v. Donaldson, 3 N.C. 57 (1798) (same); Bailey v. Jennings, 17 S.C.L 563 (1830) (rebuttable
rule); Dupre v. Harrington, 5 S.C. Eq. (1824) (same); DeBardeleben v. Beckman, I S.C. Eq. 345 (1793) (same);
see supra note 5, for the permissive chattel mortgage acts.
North Carolina did not adopt the sale of goods provision of the Statute of Frauds. See 1819 N.C. Laws,
ch. 29, p. 50 (written contracts only required for land and slaves); 3 Heny Reed, supra note 139, at 324-25 (statute
of North Carolina). South Carolina adopted the sale of goods provision in 1712. See Gadsden v. Lance, 16 S.C.
Eq. 87 (1841).
146. See 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 388 & 389 n.3
147. See id (in a trial, CJ. North discovered a party had altered the date in a contract for sale of goods only
when the other party, who could not testify under the rules, blurted the truth out in open court, causing North to
examine the document by holding it to the light, thus discovering the fraud). But see John H. Langbein, Historical
Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COL.UM. L REV. 1068, 1183 (1996)
(jurisdictional competition between King's Bench and Common Pleas resulted in significant expansion of cases
subject to jury trial under the writ of assumpsit in seventeenth century in both courts, so the judges in both courts
procurred enactment of the Statute of Frauds to reimpose writing requirements for serious transactions); A.W.B.
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACr: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSrr 604, 610
(1975) (same); Kevin M. Teevin, A History of Legislative Reform of the Common Law of Contracts, 26 U. TOL
L REV. 35, 54-56 (1994) (same, except proponent is Parliament, not judges).
148. See 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 582.
149. The mercantile aristocracy came to power with the Whigs in the 1688 Glorious Revolution. In
permanent control of Parliament the commercially-minded Whigs set national policy to encourage mercantile
expansion without overtly changing the revered common law. See Teevin, supra note 147, at 58.
150. See Hungerford v. Earle, 2 Vern. 262,23 Eng. Rep. 768 (Ch. 1691) (assignment for benefit of creditors
where trustees left possession with the debtor, contrary to the deed, sent to jury trial); see also White v. Hussey,
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Holt developed the rebuttable rule and became the first to apply it to the
nonpossessory secured transaction.' The two chancery opinions reflect Holt's
innovation of jury trial for the issue of continued possession by the settlor, seller,
and debtor. Chancery had to send the case to another court for jury trial since it did
not use juries to determine facts.' Holt readily decided cases by mercantile custom
instead of the strict common law rules, frequently consulted with merchants on
pending commercial legal matters, and used his influence with Parliament to obtain
passage of an act allowing promissory notes to become negotiable.'53
North intended the sale of goods provision to provide tangible evidence of the
agreement. But it still permitted oral conditional sales contracts in the specified
circumstances of part delivery, earnest money deposits, or symbolic delivery and
for sales under ten pounds sterling. The rebuttable rule presumed debtor possession
as fraudulent. The secured party could rebut the presumption by showing a
nonpossessory secured transaction and allow the jury to determine its validity.
Merchants in the seventeenth century generally extended credit with informal
documentation."' Consequently, their title document might be in absolute form,
fatal under the absolute-conditional rule, and require supplementation to
demonstrate the defeasance condition in light of debtor possession. The rebuttable
rule allowed this additional evidence to affect the outcome.' It eventually allowed
oral security agreements.'56
The earliest reported opinions involving the nonpossessory secured transaction
under the rebuttable rule appeared in the late seventeenth century. These two
Prec. Ch. 7, 24 Eng. Rep. 7 (1690) (commissioner refusing to send issue of continued possession under family
settlement to jury trial).
151. See Cole v. Davies, 1 Ld. Raym. 724.91 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1698) (conditional levy sale without
documentation determined valid by jury before Holt); Meggot v. Mills, I Ld. Rayn. 286, 91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B.
1697) (nonpossessory security interest documented by absolute bill of sale found valid by jury before Holt);
Winchelsea v. Maidstone, 4 Mod. 51, 87 Eng. Rep. 257 (K.B. 1691) (family settlement with continued possession
and insufficient explanation found invalid by jury before Holt); see also Cole v. White, 26 Wend. 508 (N.Y. 1841)
(Sen. Verplanck crediting Holt with devising the rebuttable or prima facie rule).
John Holt (1642-1710) formulated the defense of the Whig's Glorious Revolution in terms of
constitutional law and served as Chief Justice of the King's Bench (1689-1710). See PLUCKNET, supra note 38,
at 245-46.
152. See 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 393.
153. See Muetford v. Waltot, 1 Ld. Raym. 574.91 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1700) (to decide whether a bill could be
accepted after it was due, Holt invited eminent London merchants to discuss the matter with him); PLUCKNETr,
supra note 38, at 246-47.
154. See 6 How)SWORTH, supra note 54, 57.
155. For oral agreements supplementing title documents under the rebuttable rule, see Patten v. Smith, 5
Conn. 196 (1824); Ripley v. Dolbeir, 18 Me. 382 (1841); Flanders v. Barstow, 18 Me. 357 (1841); Smith v. Tilton,
10 Me. 350 (1831); Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 (1832); Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326 (1832); Holbrook v. Baker, 5
Me. 309 (1826); Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96 (1827); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. 464 (1833); Shumway v. Rutter,
24 Mass. 56 (1828); Witwell v. Vincent, 21 Mass. 452 (1825); Peters v. Ballister, 20 Mass. 475 (1825); Lanfear
v. Sumner, 17 Mass. 110 (1821); Northeast Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. 274 (1820); Jewett v. Warren,
12 Mass. 300 (1815); Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. 404 (1808); Ash v. Savage, 5 N.H. 545 (1831); Hendricks v.
Mount 5 NJ. Law 850 (1820); Randal v. Cook, 17 Wend. 54 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1837); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y.
S. CL 1832); Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1829); Birkbeck v. Tucker, 2 Hall 121 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1829); Ackley v. Finch, 7 Cow. 289 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1827); M'Intyre v. Scott, 8 Johns. 160 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1811);
Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Verm. 555 (1829).
156. For oral security agreements under the rebuttable rule, see Summer v. Hamlet, 29 Mass. 76 (1831)
(agreement); Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1832) (declaration); Thorn v. Hicks, 7
Cow. 289 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1827) (sale); Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826) (agreement).
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opinions did not mention the absolute-conditional rule. The King's Bench upheld
the nonpossessory secured transaction when challenged by a third party for the
purchase-money security interest and the levy-purchase security interest. 157 Their
conditions did not appear in the written documentation but occurred orally.
Courts did not routinely use the rebuttable rule for nonpossessory secured
transactions until the early nineteenth century. 58 Since this rule did not come into
general use until the early nineteenth century, three hundred years after the
absolute-conditional rule, some later commentators referred to the rebuttable rule
as the modem English rule.
1 9
B. The Bankruptcy Statutes
Bankruptcy law provided additional evidence that English courts applied the
absolute-conditional rule to the nonpossessory secured transaction. During the
Tudor-Stuart Period, before the nonpossessory secured transaction developed,
Parliament passed four Bankruptcy Statutes, one each in 1543, 1571, 1604, and
1624.'60
Parliament, controlled predominately by the landed aristocrats, devised these
157. For the purchase money exception, see Meggot v. Mills, 12 Mod. 159, 88 Eng. Rep. 1234, 1 Ld. Raym.
286, 91 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1697) (upholding absolute bill of sale for household furnishings to secure landlord's
loan to buy those goods with the debtor-tenant in possession of the furniture against tenant's supplier of ale). The
transaction, however, might have involved a court implied lien. See Ryall v. Rolle, I Atk. 169, 26 Eng. Rep. 107,
109-110 (Ch. 1750) (Meggot not decided on the basis of the absolute-conditional rule, but just decided that for
landlords the transaction is not fraudulent); see also Wiseman v. Vandeputt, 1 Eq. Cas. 56, 21 Eng. Rep. 870, 2
Vern. 203, 23 Eng. Rep. 461 (Ch. 1690) (in bankruptcy, Chancellor implied security interest for purchase-money
obligation for goods on ship that had not sailed yet to defeat general creditor).
For the levy purchase exception, see Cole v. Davis, 1 IL. Raym. 724, 91 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1698)
(upholding prebankruptcy levy execution against bankruptcy commission where purchaser permitted the debtor
to retain possession of the goods upon condition of paying off the debt as the debtor raised it from selling the
goods). The transaction, however, might have involved a court implied lien. See id. (lacks reference to a security
intention). But see Rice v. Serjeant, 7 Mod. 37, 87 Eng. Rep. 1078 (IKB. 1702) (fraudulent levy when levying
creditor stops sheriff as he seizes the goods and allows the debtor to retain them).
158. See, e.g., Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. & Ald. 418, 100 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1832) (possession is only evidence
of fraud, leave it to jury); Jezeph v. Ingram, 8 Taunt. 838, 129 Eng. Rep. 609 (C.P. 1817) (want of possession is
not in all cases a mark of fraud); Benton v. Thomhill, 7 Taunt. 150, 129 Eng. Rep. 60 (C.P. 1816) (jury to decide
whether possession was honest); Steel v. Brown, 1 Taunt. 381, 127 Eng. Rep. 881 (C.P. 1808) (rejects absolute
conditional rule); Kidd v. Rawlinson, 2 Bos. & Pull. 59, 126 Eng. Rep. 1155 (K.B. 1800). See also Eastwood v.
Brown, Ry. & Mood. 312, 171 Eng. Rep. 1032 (N.P. 1825) (sale, possession is not conclusive badge of fraud, leave
it to jury); Stewart v. Lombe, 1 Brod. & B. 511, 128 Eng. Rep. 818 (C.P. 1820) (mortgage, want of possession is
not in all cases a mask of fraud); Dewey v. Boynton, 6 East. 257, 102 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B. 1805) (family
settlement, facts must be presented to jury); Arundel v. Phipps, 10 Ves. Jr. 139, 32 Eng. Rep. 797 (Ch. 1804)
(family settlement, possession only prima facie evidence of fraud); Cadogen v. Kennet, 2 Cowp. 443, 98 Eng. Rep.
1171 (K.B. 1776) (marriage settlement, debtor possession is evidence of fraud); Martin v. Podger, 5 Burr. 2631,
98 Eng. Rep. 384, 2 Win. Black. 701, 96 Eng. Rep. 412 (KB. 1770) (sale, want of possession ought to be left to
jury).
159. See Watson v. Williams, 4 Blackf. 26. 29 (Ind. 1835).
160. See Bankruptcy Act of 1624,21 Jas. I, ch. 19 [hereinafter 1624 Bankruptcy Act], reprinted in 4 STAT.
OF REALM, supra note 7, at 1227; Bankruptcy Act of 1604, 1 Jas. , ch. 15 [hereinafter 1604 Bankruptcy Act],
reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 1031; Bankruptcy Act of 1571, 13 Eliz. I, ch. 7 [hereinafter 1571
Bankruptcy Act], reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 539; Bankruptcy Act of 1543, 34 & 35 Hen. VI1, ch.
4 [hereinafter 1543 Bankruptcy Act], reprinted in 3 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 899; see JONES, supra note 81, at
8 (four before the Bankruptcy Act of 1705, 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 8, reprinted in 8 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 461,463,
that first provided for debtor discharge).
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statutes to apply only to commercial bankrupts."" These landed aristocrats assumed
merchants lived in extravagance, which caused their bankruptcy rather than
declining economies, unavailability of cash liquidity, unwise overextentions of
credit, or other unsound business practices. So the Bankruptcy Statutes limited
bankrupts to merchants and treated them harshly."
The Bankruptcy Statutes did not apply until the merchant-debtor committed an
act of bankruptcy, originally flight to a sanctuary. Later expansions of the acts of
bankruptcy included leaving the country, keeping to one's house, arrestment for
debt, outlawry, and departing one's house with the intent to defraud creditors, added
by the 1571 Bankruptcy Statute, procuring fraudulent attachment of one's property
and committing a fraudulent conveyance of land or goods, added by the 1604
Bankruptcy Statute, and procuring a composition where a creditor takes less than
the full amount, added by the 1624 Bankruptcy Statute. 63
Bankruptcy proceedings commenced when a creditor applied to specified high
royal officials, and after the 1571 Bankruptcy Statute only to the Chancellor.1"
Bankruptcies rarely occurred before the Restoration since merchant-debtors avoided
committing an act of bankruptcy and creditors, who must initiate the proceeding,
saw no value in ratable distributions required by bankruptcy when further
extensions or compositions might yield a larger recovery. 65
These bankruptcy statutes primarily sequestered the bankrupt's assets for ratable
distribution to creditors."6 Creditors who might seek full repayment at the expense
of other creditors required restraints. 67 The 1543 Bankruptcy Statute only
161. See JONES, supra note 81 at 8-9. Non-merchants could not become bankrupts until 1861. See 15
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 98 (citing 24 & 25 Vict. ch. 1324, §§ 70-75).
162. See EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INnTruTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND CONCERNING
THE JURISDICrlON OF THE COURTS 277 (1797) (William S. Hein Co., 1986), ("the English merchant had rioted in
three kinds of costliness, viz., costly building, costly diet, and costly apparel, accompanied with neglect of his trade
and servants, and thereby consumed his wealth.'); see JONES, supra note 81, at 52-53.
163. See 1543 Bankruptcy Act, § 1, reprinted in 3 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 899-900; 1624
Bankruptcy Act, § 2, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 1227; 1604 Bankruptcy Act, § 1, reprinted in 4
STAT. OF REALM, supra at 1031; 1571 Bankruptcy Act, § 1, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 539; JONES,
supra note 81, at 16, 24.
The 1571 Bankruptcy Statute rather than make a fraudulent conveyance an act of bankruptcy punished
those creditors who fraudulently acquired the debtor's assets before or after the act of bankruptcy. See 1571
Bankruptcy Act, § 6, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 539, 540.
164. See 1604 Bankruptcy Act, §2, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 1031 (refers to 1571
statute); 1571 Bankruptcy Act, § 2, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 539; 1543 Bankruptcy Act, § 1,
reprinted in 3 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 899.
165. See JONES, supra note 81, at 10, 35.
166. See 1624 Bankruptcy Act, § 8, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7. at 1227, 1228 (even if
creditor has judgment, statute, recognizance, specialty, attachment, or other security not yet levied or reduced to
possession); 1604 Bankruptcy Act, § 2, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 1031 (refers to 1571 statute);
1571 Bankruptcy Act, § 2, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 539; 1543 Bankruptcy Act, § 1, reprinted in
3 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 899.
167. For restrictions on preferences, see 1624 Bankruptcy Act, §§ 8. 10, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM,
supra note 7, at 1227, 1228-29; 1604 Bankruptcy Act, § 3, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 1031; 1571
Bankruptcy Act, § 11, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 539, 541; 1543 Bankruptcy Act, §§ 3, reprinted
in 3 STAT. OF REAL, supra at 899, 900; see JONES. supra note 81, at 31-32 (preferences attacked to stop potential
bankrupts from conveying goods for good consideration and yet keep the goods as their own).
For application to nonpossessory secured transactions, see infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
In England courts honored preferences outside of bankruptcy, even if insolvent. See, e.g., Small v.
Oudley, 2 P. Wins. 427, 24 Eng. Rep. 799 (Ch. 1727) (assignment of leases to secure); Cock v. Goodfellow, 10
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prohibited undue preferences committed after the act of bankruptcy and the 1571
Bankruptcy Statute insulated good faith conveyances made before the act of
bankruptcy. The 1604 Bankruptcy Statute attacked fraudulent conveyances by
voiding all conveyances made before the act of bankruptcy unless made for good
consideration and value. The 1624 Bankruptcy Statute attacked unlevied judgment
liens and collusive judgments forcing these creditors to share ratably and attacked
preferences whenever made by providing in the reputed ownership clause that goods
in possession of the bankrupt, by consent of the owner, were liable to distribution. 
16
Bankruptcy law, however, did not apply to all nonpossessory secured
transactions, but only those involving merchant-debtors as provided under the
bankruptcy statutes. So a bankruptcy pronouncement on a nonpossessory secured
transaction should leave undisturbed priority resolutions under other law between,
for example, a secured creditor and a judgment creditor for a nonmerchant-debtor.
1. The Per Se Fraud Rule
The earliest threat to nonpossessory secured transactions under the bankruptcy
law came from the reputed ownership clause of the 1624 Bankruptcy Statute:
And for... that many psons before they become Bankrupts, doe convey their
goods to other Men upon good Consideracion, yet still doe keepe the same, and
are reputed the Owners thereof, and dispose the same as their owne; Be it
enacted, That if at any tyme hereafter any pson or psons shall become Bankrupt,
and... shall by the consent and pmission of the true Owner and Pprietarie, have
in their Possession Order and Disposicion, any Good or Chattels, whereof they
shalbe reputed Owners... that in every such Case the said Commissioners
... shall have power to sell and dispose the same to and for the benefitt of the
Creditors ... .69
Although this language suggests the nonpossessory secured transaction, a sale
with retained possession by consent of the secured party owner, lawyers did not
apply the clause to void such devices until 1736.7 ° The late development occurred
because lawyers initially conceived of no different rule from that used under
fraudulent conveyance law."" So the Chancery delivered its first three opinions, all
involving ships as collateral, consistent with the absolute-conditional rule, voiding
Mod. 489, 88 Eng. Rep. 822 (Ch. 1718) (deed of South Sea Company stock to secure); Demainbray v. Metcalfe,
2 Vern. 691, 23 Eng. Rep. 1048 (Ch. 1715) (payments); Hopkins v. Grey, 7 Mod. 139, 87 Eng. Rep. 1149 (K.B.
1704) (payments).
168. See JONES, supra note 81, at 8-9, 16, 31.
169. 1624 Bankruptcy Act, § 10, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 1227, 1229.
170. See Bourne v. Dodson, 1 AtkL 154, 157, 26 Eng. Rep. 100, 101 (Ch. 1740) (nonpossessory secured
transaction never thought of as violative of the reputed ownership clause until case of Stephens v. Sole in 1736);
see also JONES, supra note 81, at 32; E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGuSH LAw 277 n.1 (5th ed. 1938).
171. The late concoction (1736 for a 1624 statute) occurred since the reputed ownership clause also required
debtor possession without the true owner's consent and a chattel mortgage before 1750 was believed to provide
consent taking the transaction out of the clause. See JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MORTGAGES 42 (5th ed. 1822); Copeman v. Gallant, I P. Wms. 314, 24 Eng. Rep. 404 (Ch. 1716) (assignment
for benefit of creditors not in bankrupt trustee's estate under reputed ownership clause); Whitecomb v. Jacob, 2
Salk. 161,91 Eng. Rep. 149 (KB. 1710) (same for merchant goods in hands of bankrupt factor); L'Apostre v. Le
Plaistrier, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 133n, 22 Eng. Rep. 96 (1708) (same for consigned goods).
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a security interest in absolute form, upholding one in conditional form, and in dicta
suggesting the reputed ownership clause only voids absolute sales. 2
But in 1749 a Chancery case arose involving multiple false credits on the same
collateral. In Ryall v. Rolle,' a merchant made multiple conveyances and
assignments of his dwelling house, brewhouse, and all coppers and utensils in trade
by a mortgage with a redemption. Since some judges showed concern for false
credits, presumably some creditors did not know about the secured arrangement of
the other creditors. In Ryall, the Chancery developed the per se fraud rule to void
all nonpossessory secured transactions when challenged under the reputed
ownership clause.
The parties argued the case over the applicable rule. The bankruptcy assignees
interpreted the reputed ownership clause to void all nonpossessory preferences,
especially the bonpossessory secured transaction. It reduced all creditors, other than
those who had possession before the act of bankruptcy, such as a judgment
lienholder satisfied by execution or a pledgee by delivery, to equality as trusting on
the bankrupt personally. The mortgagees argued for application of the absolute-
conditional rule. The reputed ownership clause only prohibited those false credits
created in absolute form, not those created in conditional form. 4
172. For Chancery's voidance ofa nonpossessory secured transaction in absolute form, see Stevens v. Sole,
unreported, but described in Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 165, 170, 26 Eng. Rep. 107, 110, sub nom. Ryall v. Rowles, I
Ves. Sen. 348, 352, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1077 (Ch. 1749) (a merchant secured his borrowing with a bill of sale on
three River Thames barges with a provision for redemption; the mortgagee later imposed debtor possession); Brown
v. Heathcote, 1 Atk. 160, 161, 26 Eng. Rep. 103, 104 (Ch. 1746); Bourne, 1 Atk. at 157, 26 Eng. Rep. at 101.
For Chancery's affirmance of a nonpossessory secured transaction in conditional form, see Brown, 1
Atl at 160-64, 26 Eng. Rep. at 103-05 (a two-merchant partnership secured a loan with a deed of assignment on
cargos of two ships at sea voyaging to Guinea providing for delivery only upon default), 106 (mortgages did not
satisfy the conditions of the reputed ownership clause since a court of equity considers the mortgagor as the owner
and not the creditor); accord Atkinson v. Maling, 2 Term. Rep. 462, 100 Eng. Rep. 249 (K.B. 1788). But see Ryall,
1 Atk. at 170, 26 Eng. Rep. at 110, 1 Ves. Sen. at 359, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1080 (the Brown reasoning does not apply
in a court of law, where the mortgagee is considered as the owner).
For the dicta, arising since the parties compromised a settlement, see Bourne, 1 Atk. at 154-56, 158,
26 Eng. Rep. 100 (a merchant secured a lending with an indenture of bargain and sale of two ships, personal effects
in Virginia and Maryland, and the consigned tobacco subject to a defeasance upon payment of the debt; the time
for payment had passed, yet the debtor retained the personalty), 101-02 (most properly applicable to an absolute
sale); see also Brown, 1 Atk. at 161, 26 Eng. Rep. at 104 (confined to absolute sales).
173. 1 Atk. 165, 170,26 Eng. Rep. 107, 110, sub non. Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves. Sen. 348, 348-54,27 Eng.
Rep. 1074, 1074-78 (Ch. 1749).
174. The mortgagees also argued (1) the clause voided the chattel mortgages since the common law courts
considered the mortgagee as the true owner and (2) an adverse decision would destroy trade on credit because it
would permit certain creditors in cases of insolvency to defeat other creditors induced to lend on the basis of
apparent ownership of the collateral. See Ryall, 1 Ves. Sen. at 354, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1078-79.
The bankrupt assignees would permit exceptions for some chattel mortgages, namely, for ships and
cargos at sea provided the parties made arrangement for delivery upon arrival and for bulky goods provided the
debtor delivered the warehouse key. See id The mortgagees responded that the proposed exception would destroy
trade on credit using business assets since delivery of possession of a shop, key to a warehouse, or possession of
a ship would advertise that debtor as a bankrupt. See id., 1 Ves. Sen. at 354-56, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1078-79.
The courts had already recognized two exceptions, one for a foreclosed chattel mortgage, see West v.
Skip, I Ves. Sen. 239-40, 243, 27 Eng. Rep. 1006-07 (upholding a security interest in brewery stock converted to
a judgment lien against a collusive execution with the debtor's sisters completed before the secured party could
levy), 1009 (Ch. 1749) (the transaction did not satisfy the "consent of the owner" requirement of the clause), and
one for liens granted by a ship's master for repairs abroad under admiralty law, see Samsun v. Braggington, 1 Ves.
Sen. 443, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750). But see Buxton v. Snee, I Ves. Sen. 154, 27 Eng. Rep. 952 (Ch. 1749)
(not for repairs made in England)), and eventually recognized the exception for ships and cargos. See Marton v.
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The Chancellor, Philip Yorke, due to the importance of the situation, sought the
assistance of the common law justices on the issue of whether the reputed
ownership clause voided these transactions. The consultation resulted in the justices
determining that the reputed ownership clause voided these mortgages, but did not
agree on a single explanation. The explanations included both the effort to prevent
multiple false credits and the effort to void preferences since they destroy the
ratable distribution of the bankruptcy statutes. One of these justices noted that the
absolute-conditional rule did not even apply for fraudulent conveyance law.' The
1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute made no such distinction. Instead, under the
Fraudulent Conveyance Statute, juries determined the presence of fraud by
examining the whole circumstance, the rebuttable rule.176
The mortgagees represented the views of those who lent to fund the business.
They took a nonpossessory security interest in the business assets. The bankrupt
assignees represented those who supplied, and bought, from the business's
inventory. So the per se fraud rule benefited the small merchants. And Yorke,'7 a
zealous Whig, had risen from this class.77 His brother-in-law was a small
merchant.17  So Yorke became known for adapting the common law to new
commercial transactions."' Through Yorke much Roman law penetrated into the
English common law."'
In 1784 the King's Bench revealed its distaste for preferences and not the
multiple lendings. The King's Bench faced a vendor's lien involving a resale to the
vendor to create the security interest and a subsequent lease to the buyer-debtor so
the debtor had possession with no other mortgages. The court declared that a
merchant can not mortgage his goods and keep possession under the reputed
ownership clause of the bankruptcy laws.'
English courts aimed the per se fraud rule of bankruptcy law established by Ryall
at some evil. Bankruptcy commissioners would not enforce nonpossessory secured
transactions made by debtors who later became bankrupts. The perceived evil did
not involve the separation of possession and ownership. Lease transactions and
bailment transactions did not violate the clause because the debtor did not originally
Moore, 7 Term. Rep. 67, 101 Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1796) (exception for financing buyer who took security interest
in provided supplies held by debtor).
175. See Ryall, I Ves. Sen. at 359-60, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1081-82.
176. See Ryal, I Atk. at 173, 180, 183,26 Eng. Rep. at 112, 117, 118, 1 Ves. Sen. at 364,368,372, 27 Eng.
Rep. at 1084 (J. Bumet: preferences render bankruptcy useless), 1086 (CJ. Lee: bankruptcy statute intended to end
preferences), 1088 (LC. Hardwicke: statute fosters equal distribution). But see 1 Atk. at 171, 174, 182. 184, 26
Eng. Rep. at 111, 113, 118, 119, 1 Ves. Sen. at 361, 365, 370, 372, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1082 (J. Bumet: citing
Hardwicke-statute intended to end false credits), 1084 (B. Parker intended to end false credits), 1087 (CJ. Lee:
same), 1088 (LC. Hardwicke: same).
177. See 6 CAMBEaL, supra note 89, at 158-304 (life of Lord Hardwicke). Philip Yorke (1690-1770) served
as Solicitor-General (1720-1723), Attorney-General (1723-1733), Chief Justice of the King's Bench (1733-1737),
and as Lord Chancellor (1737-1764) and became Baron Hardwicke in 1733.
178. See id. at 158.
179. See id. at 159.
180. See id.at 183.
181. See 21 GEORGE SMIrH, Dictionary of National Biography (1885-1901). The per se fraud role parroted
Roman law's treatment of undisclosed hypothecas as fraudulent. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
182. See Bryson v. Wylie (KLB. 1784), reported in Longham v. Biggs. I Bos. & P. 83, 126 Eng. Rep. 790,
791-92 n. (C.P. 1797).
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own the personalty.183 The courts crafted Ryall and its progeny at the evil of the
debtor's granting a preference, not his multiple lendings. Only the preference
defeated the ratable distribution set-up by the bankruptcy laws.
2. The Modified Per se Fraud Rule
The 1604 Bankruptcy Act posed the second, and less serious, threat to
nonpossessory secured transactions. That statute defined an act of bankruptcy to
include:
mak[ing], or caus[ing] to be made, any fraudulent Graunte, or Conveyance, of
his, or their Landes, Tenements, Goods, or Chattels, to the intente, or wherebie
his her or theire Creditors ... shall, or may be defeated, or delayed for the
Recoverie of their juste and true Debts.'"
A ruling making execution of a nonpossessory secured transaction an act of
bankruptcy rendered the date of becoming a bankrupt earlier than otherwise. This
voided transactions taking possession of the debtor's assets, such as by a pledge or
judgment lien, between that act of bankruptcy and the next, more traditional act of
bankruptcy, thereby enlarging the bankrupt's estate for division amongst the
creditors. The collateral subject to the transaction also became part of the estate for
distribution, but the reputed ownership clause already had that effect. 8 5
The key to understanding this provision involves two items. First, the debtor's
intent required to trigger the provision was not to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
as under the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute, but to defeat or delay creditors
in collecting their ratable apportionment of the bankrupt's assets under the
bankruptcy laws. The decision of Ryall in 1750 made it clear that fraudulent
conveyance rules had no place in bankruptcy law. Second, by its very nature a
nonpossessory secured transaction prefers the secured creditor over the other
creditors. So creditors pressured prospective bankrupts to grant a nonpossessory
security interest in order to avoid the ratable distribution available in a bankruptcy
proceeding.
Opinions involving the bankruptcy fraudulent conveyance clause also developed
late. Lawyers initially used the absolute-conditional rule under the Fraudulent
Conveyance Statute to determine whether a particular nonpossessory secured
transaction constituted a fraudulent conveyance. If it did, then the 1604 Bankruptcy
Statute also made it an act of bankruptcy permitting a creditor to force a bankruptcy
proceeding.
183. For leases, see Copeman v. Gallant I P. Wins. 314,321, 24 Eng. Rep. 404,406 (Ch. 1716) (trust for
creditors of personalty not part of trustee-bankrupt's estate).
For bailments, see exparte Dumas, 2 Ves. Sen. 582, 28 Eng. Rep. 372 (Ch. 1754) (negotiable bills not
part of bankrupt-factor's estate); Flyn v. Mathews, 1 Atk. 185, 187, 26 Eng. Rep. 120, 121 (Ch. 1748) (consignment
of tar not part of bankrupt-consignee's estate); Scott v. Surman, W'dles 400, 125 Eng. Rep. 1235 (C.P. 1742) (goods
sent to a bankrupt-factor to sell not part of bankrupts estate); Godfrey v. Furzo, 3 P. Wms. 185, 24 Eng. Rep. 1022
(Ch. 1733) (same); Whitcomb v. Jacob, 2 Salk. 160,91 Eng. Rep. 149 (Ch. 1710) (same).
184. 1604 Bankruptcy Act, § 2, reprinted in 4 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 1031.
185. See Worseley v. Demattos, 2 Keny. 218,236,96 Eng. Rep. 1160, 1167, 1 Burr. 467, 483,97 Eng. Rep.
407,415 (K.B. 1758).
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But in mid-eighteenth century, the English courts focused on a different intent,
namely, an intention to avoid ratable distribution in bankruptcy. Chancery's first
two opinions, involving accounts receivable, required the intent close in time before
an additional act of bankruptcy, without mentioning whether the debtor retained
possession of the collateral.
8 6
Then in 1758 the King's Bench extended these principles to implying that intent.
In Worseley v. Demattos 87 a financially failing merchant in a refinancing granted
a nonpossessory security interest in all his assets to one creditor and, under
instructions from the secured creditor, shortly delivered the collateral to the secured
creditor and committed a traditional act of bankruptcy. The parties argued the case
over the issue of the appropriate rule. To void the delivery of the collateral to the
secured party on the eve of the bankruptcy, the bankruptcy assignees contended that
the preference, used to avoid a ratable distribution, constituted an act of bankruptcy
as a fraudulent conveyance. The secured creditor countered that he had made the
refinancing in good faith. It did not violate the absolute-conditional rule. The King's
Bench enunciated the modified per se fraud rule. A nonpossessory secured
transaction constitutes an act of bankruptcy if the creditor's motive for entering the
transaction aims to defeat the ratable distribution of a bankruptcy proceeding. Two
conditions, if satisfied, infer that intent: (1) a transaction occurring sufficiently
close enough to traditional acts of bankruptcy and (2) the collateral amounting to
most of the business assets.'88 The King's Bench confirmed the modified per se
fraud rule in two subsequent opinions. 9
186. See exparte Gaynor (Ch. 1755), unreported but described in Worseley v. Demattos, 2 Keny. 218, 230,
96 Eng. Rep. 1160, 1165, 1 Burr. 467, 477-78, 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 412-13 (K.B. 1758) (voided an assignment of
all goods, stock in trade, and book debts except household goods, watches, plate, bills of exchange, inland bills,
promissory notes, and cash to trustees for the benefit of creditors for the purpose of postponing one creditor to the
rest by exclusion from the assignment due to the intent); Unwine v. Oliver (Ch. 1739), unreported but described
in Worseley v. Demattos, 2 Keny. 218, 222, 96 Eng. Rep. 1160, 1162, 1 Burr. 467, 472, 481, 97 Eng. Rep. 407,
410, 415 (K.B. 1758) (upheld 1739 assignment of some account receivables a month before the would-be
additional act of bankruptcy due to the absence of an intent to defeat the bankruptcy laws).
187. 21Keny. 218,218-23,226-29,238,96Eng. Rep. 1160,1161-62,1163-65,1169, 1 Burr. 467,468-72,
476-77, 483-84, 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 408-10 (debtor, a brewer, corn factor, and miller, transferred by 1755 indenture
prepared by lawyers, as security and with a condition defeasance upon payment of all sums spent on buying debtor's
outstanding promissory notes and all future advances, all his stock, utensils, and personalty employed in his
businesses to the creditor who was to serve as his new banker in London; debtor retained possession of collateral,
accepted the creditor's agent as his bookkeeper, and three weeks later, upon recommendation of the bookkeeper,
delivered possession of the collateral to the creditor's agent and then committed a traditional act of bankruptcy,
refusing to a pay another creditor), 412-13, 415-16 (KB. 1758) (the creditor took delivery on the eve of bankruptcy
to avoid the reputed ownership clause and the creditor so intended from the beginning by placing his agent as
bookkeeper and the short space of time between execution and the traditional act of bankruptcy).
188. For the proximity element, see Worseley at 1 Burr. 483, 97 Eng. Rep. at 415-16 (had the Ryall
transactions, long before the traditional act of bankruptcy, been proposed as acts of bankruptcy, it would have been
disproved).
For the totality element, see Hooper v. Smith, I Win. Black. 441, 96 Eng. Rep. 252 (K.B. 1763) (an
assignment of a portion of the debtors stock in a silk business not as security, but without delivery of possession,
did not constitute an act of bankruptcy).
189. See Law v. Skinner, 2 Win. Black. 996, 596-97,96 Eng. Rep. 585, 585-86 (K.B. 1775) (a merchant
assigned in 1769 by way of mortgage all his stock in trade, excepting only his household goods of trifling value,
and committed the traditional act of bankruptcy in 1771; denied recovery from the bankruptcy assignees for selling
the collateral since the nonpossessory secured transaction amounted to an act of bankruptcy since it covered the
entire business assets, leaving nothing left in the business to generate income); Wilson v. Day, 2 Burr. 827, 827-30,
97 Eng. Rep. 583, 583-85 (IB. 1760) (a distributor of notes, in poor financial state, secured a creditor through
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Again English courts aimed the modified per se fraud rule of bankruptcy law
established by Worseley, voiding the grant of a nonpossessory secured transaction
close in time to another act of bankruptcy and for almost all of the debtor's business
assets, at a perceived evil. Similar to the reputed ownership clause, the court
directed the modified per se fraud rule at a creditor escaping ratable distribution in
bankruptcy.
C. Post Mid-Eighteenth Century Fraudulent Conveyance Law
After the American Revolution, English law resolved one issue that later surfaced
in the United States as part of the received English law. English courts concluded
that bankruptcy law's per se fraud rule did not apply to fraudulent conveyance law.
Once the English courts adopted a per se fraud rule for nonpossessory secured
transactions under bankruptcy law, those courts reexamined the nonbankruptcy law.
Should the courts continue to use the rule applicable to the Fraudulent Conveyance
Statute to determine whether to enforce nonpossessory secured transactions under
nonbankruptcy law? Bankruptcy law did not include nonmerchant-debtors and
debtors who did not commit an act of bankruptcy. The leading opinions, decided
after the American Revolution but accepted by American courts as the
pronouncement of the English common law, reannounced the absolute-conditional
rule and then reaffirmed the rebuttable rule.
In Edwards v. Harben'9° in 1788 the debtor executed an absolute bill of sale on
furniture, medicine, and stock in trade for security in 1786 on an old debt. The
debtor retained possession, only engaging in symbolic delivery of the goods with
a corkscrew. The creditor under earlier negotiations could enter and take the goods
after fourteen days to sell. The debtor died on the twelfth day. The creditor took
possession on the thirteenth day. A prior creditor sued under his prior debt to
recover these goods. The plaintiff-prior creditor argued this transaction constituted
a fraudulent conveyance both under the per se fraud rule as established by Ryall and
the modified per se fraud rule of Worseley. The defendant-secured party responded
that bankruptcy law rules had no application under fraudulent conveyance law. The
King's Bench, on the basis of Stone, reaffirmed the absolute-conditional rule: unless
the possession accompanied and followed the deed, it was void. So the secured
creditor lost since his debtor's possession did not follow the terms of the bill of sale.
The rebuttable rule's application to the nonpossessory secured transaction,
however, reappeared in 1800." In Kidd v. Rawlinson,'" the debtor's brother-in-law
a 1760 assignment of everything he owned followed two days later by a defeasance document, both prepared by
lawyers but not specifying the amount due; the creditor shortly obtained possession of the collateral, the debtor
committed a traditional act of bankruptcy, the bankruptcy assignees broke into the creditor's house to take the
collateral, and the creditor sued for trespass; the court upheld the defense to the trespass action that the taking of
the nonpossessory security interest constituted an act of bankruptcy, so the collateral did not belong to the creditor).
190. 2 Term. Rep. 587, 587-97, 100 Eng. Rep. 315, 315-21 (K.B. 1788).
191. For nonpossessory secured transactions, see Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. &Ad. 498, 506, 110 Eng. Rep.
180, 183 (KB. 1832) (expressly conditional); Jezeph v. Ingrain, 8 Taunt. 838, 843, 129 Eng. Rep. 609, 611 (C.P.
1817) (expressly conditional); Benton v. Thornhill, 7 Taunt. 150, 151, 129 Eng. Rep. 60 (C.P. 1816) (excuse of
lived with debtor); Kidd v. Rawlinson, 2 Bos. & Pull. 59, 59-60, 126 Eng. Rep. 1155, 1155-56 (K.B. 1800); see
also Steel v. Brown, I Taunt. 381, 127 Eng. Rep. 881 (C.P. 1808) (rejecting the absolute-conditional rule to uphold
a nonpossessory secured transaction challenged by a judgment lien).
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purchased the debtor's furniture at a sheriff's sale. The debtor remained in
possession so he could continue running his public house. Another creditor sent the
debtor to debtor's prison to force a bill of sale for the furniture. This creditor sold
them. The jury determined that the initial transaction constituted a secured lending
by the brother-in-law to the debtor to acquire the furniture. Although the transaction
violated the absolute-conditional rule, the court upheld the transaction since the jury
found no fraud. The court cited a statement in a treatise by Francis Buller to support
the new rebuttable rule when dealing with a nonpossessory secured transaction
challenged as a fraudulent conveyance: "but yet the donor continuing in possession
is not in all cases a mark of fraud; as where a donee lends his donor money to buy
goods, and at the same time takes a bill of sale of them for securing the money."
Another treatise source for the rule comes from John Joseph Powell's work on
mortgages. Powell, when discussing chattel mortgages under the 1571 Fraudulent
Conveyance Statute, described debtor possession as creating a presumption of
fraud. He then set forth three situations rebutting that presumption: (1) substitute
delivery, such as permitted under the sales of goods provision of the 1677 Statute
of Frauds, suggesting presence of a nonpossessory secured transaction, (2) delivery
of title documents when delivery was impossible such as for ships (bill of sale) or
goods (bill of lading) at sea, suggesting presence of a nonpossessory secured
transaction, and (3) specific words in the contract such as under a conditional bill
of sale providing for debtor possession, the old absolute-conditional rule. 93
For eighteenth century use of the rule, see Worseley v. Demattos, 2 Keny. 218, 237, 96 Eng. Rep. 1060,
1167, 1 Burr. 467, 484, 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 416 (KB. 1758) (bankruptcy case); RyaU v. Rolle, I Atk. 165, 168-69,
26. Eng. Rep. 107, 109-10. sub non Ryall v. Rowles, I Ves. Sen. 348, 359-61, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1081-82 (Ch.
1750) (bankruptcy case); see also Martin v. Podger, 2 Wi. Black. 701,702, 96 Eng. Rep. 412, 5 Burr. 2631, 2633,
98 Eng. Rep. 384,385 (KB. 1770) (sale); Hungerford v. Earle, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 148,21 Eng. Rep. 948,949, Freem.
Ch. 120, 22 Eng. Rep.. 1098, 2 Vem. 261, 262, 23 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (Ch. 1691) (mortgage on realty).
192. 2 Bos. & Pull. 59, 59-60, 126 Eng. Rep. 1155, 1155-56 (K.B. 1800) (citing Buller's Nisi Prius); see
FRANCIS BULER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUs 258 (1806).
Buller's work first appeared in 1767. See 12 HOLDSWORT, supra note 54, at 354. Justice Buller,
however, thought his rule equivalent to the absolute-conditional rule. See Edwards v. Harben, 2 Term. Rep. 587,
100 Eng. Rep. 315 (KB. 1788) (. Bullet using absolute-conditional rule for a nonpossessory secured transaction);
Haselinton v. Gill, 3 Term. Rep. 620n, 100 Eng. Rep. 766n (KB. 1784) (J. Buller using absolute-conditional rule
for marriage settlement).
193. See POWELL, supra note 171, at 21 (presumption), 23 (substitute delivery and inability to deliver), 33
(specified words in the contract). Powell's work first appeared in 1785. See 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at
382.
Parties used the delivery alternative of Powell's rule to justify debtor possession under a nonpossessory
secured transaction in several early opinions of the northern United States. See Starr v. Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817)
(brig enrolled at New York custom house, debtor continued as master); Clark v. Richards, I Conn. 54 (1814) (sloop
enrolled at New London custom house, debtor continued as master); Tucker v. Buffington, 15 Mass. 477 (1819)
(ship at sea, sloop in Boston, enrolled at Portland custom house); Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. 352 (1817) (machines
too large to take out of factory without disassembly, recorded real estate mortgage); Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass.
300 (1815) (logs on the river behind a boom, secured's agent viewed from hill); Weller v. Wayland, 17 Johns. 102
(N.Y. S. Ct 1819) (1000 cigars for goods, wares, merchandise, and household furniture of a tobacconist); M'Intyre
v. Scott, 8 Johns. 160 (N.Y. S. CL 1811) (brig enrolled at New York custom house); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns.
258 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1810) (one spoon for household furniture, goods, and chattels in house of tenant).
Opinions of this sort continue after 1820, with the added situations of symbolic delivery by words,
handing over a key, and laying hands on the collateral. See Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832) (recorded realty
mortgage); Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831) (recorded realty deed); Haskell v. Greeley, 3 Me. 425 (1825)
(words at bank for machinery); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass. 59 (1827) (one piece of household furniture for all);
Homes v. Crane, 19 Mass. 607 (1824) (secured party laid hands on equipment left with debtor); Gordon v.
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These two formulations of the rule, by Buller and Powell, meant the
nonpossessory secured transaction alone rebutted the presumption of fraud by virtue
of debtor possession.
English legal writers also have recognized these pre-nineteenth century rules.
Before the Bill of Sale Act of 1854, the English counterpart to the American chattel
mortgage acts, English courts voided a bill of sale, the English chattel mortgage,
against third parties only if proven fraudulent under the Fraudulent Conveyance
Statute or if the chattels had vested in bankruptcy assignees as within the reputed
ownership clause.194 Otherwise the court enforced the nonpossessory secured
transaction against third parties.' 95
The jury aspect of the rebuttable rule's application to nonpossessory secured
transactions lead Parliament to pass the English Bill of Sale Act of 1854 to prevent
Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 19 Mass. 249 (1824) (brig at sea, enrolled at Portland custom house); Parks
v. Hall, 19 Mass. 206 (1824) (secured party had key to loft where wine stored); Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. 388
(1823) (brig at sea, enrolled at Boston custom house); Fisher v. Willing, 23 Pa. (8 Serg. & Rawle) 118 (1822) (ship
enrolled); Sturgis v. Warren, I I Verm. 432 (1839) (recorded realty mortgage); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Verm. 423
(1830) (recorded realty mortgage).
194. See E.LG. TYLER & N.E. PAlIER, CROSSLEY VAINES' PERSONAL PROPERTY 450 (5th ed. 1973); JOHN
HERBERT WILAMS & Wni.AM MORSE CROWDY, GOoDERE's MODERN LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 100-01 (5th
ed. 1912) (same); supra note 7 (for the Bill of Sale Act), 116-19 (for the Fraudulent Conveyance Statute) and 169
(for the reputed ownership clause) and accompanying texts.
The majority in value of those creditors who proved debts over ten pounds chose the bankruptcy
assignees at their second meeting. See Bankruptcy Act of 1732, 5 Geo. I, ch. 30, §§ 26 & 27, reprinted in 16
DANBY PICKERING, THE STATUrES AT LARGE 335, 349-50 (1765); The Case of Bankrupts, 2 Co. Rep. 25a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 441,457 (K.B. 1584).
England called their act a Bill of Sales Act since their nonpossessory secured transactions generally
involved merchant goods. England lacked realty recording statutes. See supra note 7. The English also funded their
factories internally, not from loans, since their factories evolved from the putting-out system. See BARBARA
TUCKER, SAMUEL SLATER AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERiCAN TEXTI.E INDUSTRY, 1790-1860 (1984); 6 THE
CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 276-77 (in the putting-out system, a merchant distributor or supplier
hired home workers to process the raw materials for him to distribute the finished product), 297-98 (using
accumulated capital to develop the factory by bringing the workers under one roof with machinery) (HJ. Habakkuh
& M. Poteon eds., 1965).
Gilmore recognized his historical interpretation failed to explain the later adoption of a chattel mortgage
act by the English. See 1 GILMORE, supra note 9, at 25-26 (American and English development of security devices
differed in the nineteenth century with the United States developing trust receipts, factor's liens, equipment trusts,
and bailment leases). The differing financing methods begins this explanation.
The English did have one earlier filing statute for security interests. The Navigation Act of 1695
required registration of mortgages on ships involved in the American trade. In England, the ship registry laws were
mandatory for title. See Young v. Brander, 8 East 10, 103 Eng. Rep. 248 (K.B. 1806) (under Navigation Act of
1794,34 Geo. I, ch. 68, § 15, reprinted in GREAT BRrrAiN, AcTS OF PARLIAMENT, 34 GEO. 111 (1794)). English
registry acts commenced with the Navigation Acts of 1660, requiring registration of British-owned foreign ships,
of 1695, requiring registration of British-owned, British- and Plantation-built, ships engaged in the plantation trade,
and of 1786, requiring registration of British-built and -owned ships. See Navigation Act of 1660, 12 Car. I, ch.
18, § 10, reprinted in 5 STAT. OF REALM, supra note 7, at 246, 248; Navigation Act of 1695-96, 7 & 8 Win. I, ch.
22, § 16, reprinted in 7 STAT. OF REALM, supra at 103, 106-07; Navigation Act of 1786, 26 Geo. II, ch. 60, § 3,
reprinted in GREAT BRrrAIN, AcrS OF PARUiAMENT, 26 GEo. m 111, 112 (1786); CHARLES, LORD TENTERDEN,
A TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO MERCHANT SHI'S AND SEAMEN 76-77 (14th ed. 1901).
195. For secured party victories under the rebuttable rule, see, for example, Eveleigh v. Purssard, 2 Mood.
& R. 539, 174 Eng. Rep. 374 (Ech. 1844); Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. & Add. 498, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. 1832);
Jezeph v. Ingram, 3 Taunt. 838, 129 Eng. Rep. 609 (C.P. 1817); Benton v. Thornhill, 7 Taunt. 156, 129 Eng. Rep.
60 (C.P. 1816); Steel v. Brown, I Taunt. 381, 127 Eng. Rep. 881 (C.P. 1808); Kidd v. Rawlinson, 2 Bos. & Pull.
59, 126 Eng. Rep. 155 (K.B. 1800).
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perjuries. Perjury might establish a sham nonpossessory secured transaction or
defeat a legitimate one.'
III. AMERICAN ADOPTION OF THE ENGLISH RULES
The fraudulent theorists assumed one of the four English rules, namely the per
se fraud rule, automatically applied to English America. This rule did not have
general application. It applied only to merchants and then only to protect
bankruptcy's ratable distribution.
But knowledge of the English rules for handling nonpossessory secured
transactions during the eighteenth century does not convert directly into knowledge
of the American pre-chattel mortgage act rules. Although English law had no
authority in the American states, it provided a source for American courts to
formulate their rules. Since, American colonials borrowed from English merchants,
they became well-versed in using nonpossessory secured transactions and the
English rules dealing with the transaction.' Since the American colonies had their
own methods for handling bankruptcies, most did not adopt the per se fraud rule the
fraudulent theorists claimed.
A. American Reception of the English Common Law
The Crown of England ruled the American colonies during the colonial era but
not as part of the Kingdom of England. English law held that if English settlers
entered an uninhabited region, they took with them the laws of England; but, if
English settlers entered an area by conquest, such as the American colonies, only
the Crown had authority to declare what English laws, if any, applied. Parliament
alone had no right to legislate for the colonies. Only the Crown could, provided the
Crown extended a specific law to the colonies.'
The Crown in drawing up the colonial charters chose not to extend any English
laws to the colonies. Instead the Crown specified that colonial legislators must
adopt acts agreeable, and not contrary, to the laws and statutes of England. The
Crown also specified that the colonial legislators must treat the colonists as if born
in England and not deprive them of their liberties and immunities. Under these
charters, many of the seventeenth century colonial legislatures enacted principles
from the non-common law courts since they were more familiar with this law.'"
196. See Bills of Sale Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict ch. 36, reprinted in 46 GREAT BRIrAIN, THE STATUrES OF
THE UNrrED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN & IRELAND. 17 & 18 Vict. 140-43 (1854); Cookson v. Swine, 9 App.
Cas. 653,664-65 (H.L 1884) (. Blackburn); TYLER & PALMER, supra note 194, at 450; WLIAMS & CROWDY,
supra note 194, at 100-01.
197. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND PoLCS IN AMERICAN FROM THE REVOLlItON TO THE CIVIL WAR
33 (1957) (colonial merchants generally got 18 months credit from British suppliers, but for domestic transactions
they borrowed paper money on mortgage security since they owned land); JONATHAN HUGHES, AMERICAN
ECONOMIC HISTORY 53-56, 75 (3rd ed. 1990) (payments balanced for northern merchants and southern planters
from English extension of credit). For English rules for the nonpossessory secured transaction, see supra notes I I 1-
96 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Smith v. Brown, 2 SaHL 666,91 Eng. Rep. 566 (K.B. n.d.) (Virginia by conquest); Blankard
v. Galdy, 2 Salk. 411, 91 Eng. Rep. 356 (KB. 1693) (Jamaica by conquest). See BROWN, supra note 87, at 1-3,
12-13.
199. See id. at 4,6-7. For local court laws, see, for example, Julius Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom
in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 CoWM. L REv. 416 (1931) (example of county, manorial, and borough
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Under these principles the colonies upheld the nonpossessory secured
transaction. In 1682 the Connecticut General Court upheld a chattel mortgage, a
nonpossessory secured transaction but with possession in a third party, the debtor's
agent, on a tannery's inventory and equipment against a levying judgment lien.2'
Since the southern colonies adopted their chattel mortgage acts in the eighteenth
century before the commencement of their reported opinions, they provide little
evidence as to the pre-chattel mortgage act legal rules. For this reason this article
generally excludes the southern states formed from the colonies, and their progeny,
from this discussion. Yet nineteenth century southern judges recognized
enforcement of the nonpossessory secured transaction before passage of their
chattel mortgage acts in the eighteenth century.2"'
On the eve of the American Revolution, this remained the English legal position.
The common law and the acts of Parliament did not extend to the American
colonies." 2 The American colonists, however, disagreed. They intermittently
claimed the statutory and common law of England applied to them. They still
claimed to be Englishmen. First they contended that the charter requirement that
their laws agree with the laws of England amounted to an extension of the statutory
and common law of England. °3 Later, they contended that the charter concern for
"liberties and immunities" conferred an extension of the statutory and common law
of England. 2" And third they enacted by reference large portions of the English
statutes and the common law, most notably South Carolina in 1712 and North
Carolina in 1715, whose efforts the Crown did not challenge.'
When colonies rebel, they may decide what law to adopt as their initial laws.2'
Consequently, the First Continental Congress claimed that the common law and the
English statutes at the time of colonization applied to the colonies.2' They
perceived their legal and governmental traditions as English. Although not adopted
on a national level, eleven colonies between 1776 and 1784 adopted directly or
indirectly some provision for use of the English common law and the English
statutes. In November 1785 Thomas Jefferson concluded the colonies had adopted
the British system of laws.2'8 Northern states formed from the colonies included
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
court law in the Plymouth Colony).
200. See 3 TRUmBUU., supra note 143, at 113. The report gave no explanation for third party possession,
however, the debtor, a decedent's estate, had an administrator.
201. See Hambelton v. Hayward, 4 Hen. &J. 443,445 (Md. 1816) (Maryland passed the law of 1729 because
courts previously refused to find the nonpossessory secured transaction fraudulent under the Fraudulent
Conveyance Statute); Clayborn v. Hill, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 177, 183 (Ch. 1793) ("the law of 1748 [amending the law
of 1734] is not creative of the right to mortgage personal property, because it existed at common law . .
202. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at 107.
203. See BROWN, supra note 87, at 12 (example of 1757 Nova Scotia claim for application of English
counterfeiting statute).
204. Id. at 16 (example of 1803 American edition of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES).
205. See id. at 14, 17.
206. See id. at 21, at 24 (of the remaining two, Rhode Island did so in 1798 and Connecticut in 1818).
207. See 1 JOURNALOFTHECONTINENTALCONGRESS 1774-1789 63, 69 (1904) (Declaration of Rights, Oct.
1774).
208. See 9 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 4, 6 (Julian Boyd ed., 1954) (Jefferson's account of Stanhope
Affair, Nov. 1, 1785).
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Similarly, when Congress creates new states from territories or other states, the
organizational documents may specify the initial laws. Northern states formed from
territories or other states included Maine, Vermont, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana,
Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa.
These sixteen northern states provided for English law in one of six different
degrees: (1) continuance of the laws heretofore in force, (2) continuance of the
common law and English statutes heretofore in force, (3) continuance of the English
common law and any reenacted English statutes, (4) adoption of the common law
and the English statutes passed prior to 1607, (5) adoption of the common law, and
(6) rejection of English law.
The first group included Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and
Maine. Each of these states provided in their first constitution in 1780, 1784, 1818,
and 1819, respectively, that the "laws heretofore in force" should continue. The
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, typical of the group, provided:
All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved in the
Province, Colony, or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practiced on in the
courts of law, shall still remain and be in full force, until altered or repealed by
the legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights and
liberties contained in this constitution.'
The colonial era dispute over the applicability of the English common law and
English statutes made ambiguous what law the constitutional provision meant. Each
state's supreme court delivered an opinion, in 1807, 1837, 1823, and 1835,
respectively, that it meant the English common law and those English statutes
amending or altering the common law at the time of the emigration and some few
other English statutes passed since the emigration adopted in the colony.21 This law
included the 1571 Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, but excluded the English
bankruptcy statutes.21 1 The colonial legislatures had passed different bankruptcy
acts. The highest courts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire specifically ruled the
1624 Bankruptcy Statute inapplicable in their states."
209. MASS. CONST. 1780, ch. VI, art VI; see CoNN. CONST. 1818, art. 10, § 5 ("All laws not contrary to, or
inconsistent with, the provisions of this Constitution shall remain in force until they shall expire by their own
limitation, or shall be altered or repealed by the General Assembly... "); see also MAINE CONST. 1819, art. X, § 1
("All laws now in force in this State, and not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain, and be in force, until
altered or repealed by the Legislature... "); N.H. CONSr. 1784, art. 90 (virtually identical to Mass.).
210. See Card v. Grinman, 5 Conn. 164, 168 (1823), confirming, Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day 163, 189 (Conn.
1805) (the English common law and the English statutory law relating to it); Cottell v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222 (1835)
(those English laws recognized in Massachusetts as of 1819); Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 534 (1807);
State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550, 559-64 (1837) (referring to a statute of April 9, 1777, adopting the English common
law).
211. For fraudulent conveyance law, see, for example, The Watchman, 29 Fed. Cas. 372, 376, 1 Ware 232
(D. CL Me. 1832) (Maine law); Fowler v. Frisbie, 3 Conn. 320, 324 (1820); Goodwin v. Hubbard, 15 Mass. 210,
214 (1818); Everett v. Read, 3 N.H. 55, 55 (1824).
Colonial bankruptcy acts precluded application of English bankruptcy statutes. For Massachusetts, see,
PErER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDrrORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY FOR DEBT, AND BANKRuTCY 1607-1900
45-50 (1974) (1714, 1757, 1765, 1838). For New Hampshire. see idt at 54-55, 63 (1715). For Connecticut, see id.
at 78-79, 84 (1763, 1853). Maine clearly adopted Massachusetts law. See Cottrell v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222 (1835)
(those English laws recognized in Massachusetts as of 1819).
212. See Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 287, 289 (1811) (English bankruptcy law does not apply in Mass.);
Coburn v. Pickering, 3 N.H. 415,419 (1826) (the 1624 act does not apply in N.H.).
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The second group included Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. These two states
provided by statute in 1777 and 1798, respectively, that the common law and the
English statutory law should continue. The Pennsylvania statute provided:
[The common law and such of the statute laws of England, as have heretofore
been in force in the said province, excepted as hereafter excepted [shall be in
force and binding] .... 213
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and for Rhode Island the Federal Circuit Court,
concluded that this language meant the English common law, plus those statutes
that the provincial courts had actually applied before the act.214 These same courts
determined that the language encompassed the Fraudulent Conveyance Statute.
215
In Rhode Island this law excluded the English bankruptcy statutes since Rhode
Island's colonial legislature passed a bankruptcy act.216 Pennsylvania, however,
waited until after the Revolution before passing a bankruptcy act.217 That act applied
only to merchants and contained a reputed ownership clause.218 But it only remained
effective for seven years.2 19 Never-the-less, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded the statutory provision permitted use of the 1624 Bankruptcy Statute
opinions.22°
The third group included New York and New Jersey. Each of these states
adopted a constitutional provision in 1777 and 1776, respectively, mandating
English common law and certain English statutes. The New York Constitution
provided:
[S]uch parts of the common law of England and the statute law of England ... ,
as together did form the law of said colony on ... [April 19, 1775] shall be and
continue the law of this State subject to alterations... as the legislature... shall
m.. Make .... 221
The respective legislatures enacted a law repealing all English statutes in 1786
and 1799, respectively, except as reenacted by the legislature.22 The reenacted acts
213. 1777 Pa. Laws 1777, ch. 2, § 2, p. 3; see also 1798 R.I. Laws 1798 ("[ln all cases in which provision
is not made... at common law... the statute laws of England, which have heretofore been introduced into practice
in this state, shall continue .... "), reprinted in THE FIwST LAWS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 75, 78 (John D.
Cushing comp., 1983).
214. See Steere v. Field, 22 Fed. Cas. 1210, 1224, 2 Mas. 486 (Cir. Ct. R.L 1822) (Rhode Island law);
Morris's Lessee v. Vanderen, I Pa. (I Dallas) 64,67 (1782).
215. See, e.g., Bean v. Smith, 2 Fed. Cas. 1143, 1150-53,2 Mas. 252 (Cir. Ct. R.I. 1821) (Rhode Island law);
Lessee of Hartley v. M'Anulty, 9 Pa. (4 Yeates) 95 (1804).
216. See COLEMAN, supra note 211, at 91, 93 (1745, 1756, 1828); but see Greene v. Darling, 10 Fed. Cas.
1144, 1148, 4 Mas. 201 (Cir. Ct. R.I. 1828) (R.I. law, 1732 statute set-off similar to R.I. statute).
217. See COLEMAN, supra note 21!, at 151, 153.
218. See 1785 Pa. Laws, ch. 230, §§ I (merchants) & 20 (reputed ownership clause).
219. See 1785 Pa. Laws, ch. 230, § 40.
220. See Price v. Ralston, 2 Pa. (2 Dall.) 60, 61-62 (1790) (1624 statute); see also Pleasants v. Meng, I Pa.
(I Dal.) 380, 390-91 (1788) (1732 statute); Wickersham v. Nicholson, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 118, 119-20
(1826) (applying the 1604 statute).
221. N.Y. 1777 CONSr. arL 35; see also N.J. 1776 CONST., § 22 ("... the common law of England, as well
as so much of the statute law, as have heretofore practiced in this colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall
be altered by a future law of the Legislature.").
222. See 1786 N.Y. aws, ch. 35, § 1, p. 247-48; 1799 N.J. Laws, ch. 821, §§ 4-5, p. 608-09.
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included the Fraudulent Conveyance Statute.223 In both states colonial legislatures
had enacted bankruptcy statutes.' The highest courts in both the New York and
New Jersey ruled the 1624 Bankruptcy Statute inapplicable to fraudulent
conveyances in their states.225
The fourth group included Indiana and Illinois. Although these states'
organizational documents left the issue open, they adopted statutes in 1807 and
1812, respectively, adopting the English common law and those related English
statutes enacted prior to 1607.226 This would include the 1571 Fraudulent
Conveyance Statute, but not the 1624 Bankruptcy Statute.
The fifth group included Vermont and Michigan, both arriving at this law
differently. In 1779 Vermont passed a statute adopting the common law as
understood in New England. The legislature expanded this act in 1782 and
reenacted in 1787 to include the English common law and English statutes
connected with the common law as of October 1, 1760. In 1796 the legislature
repealed this act and replaced it with "so much of the common law of England, as
is applicable to the local situation and circumstance, and is not repugnant to the
constitution. '  Michigan's organization statute left the issue open." A territorial
act of 1810 specifically rejected the acts of the predecessor entities, the Northwest
Territory and Territory of Indiana, including acts of the English Parliament.229 But
an opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court in 1828 ruled that this act left the
English common law, adopted by Congress in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.230
223. See Magniac v. Thompson, 16 Fed. Cas. 451,457, Baldw. 344 (Cir. Ct. Pa. 1831) (New Jersey law);
Beals v. Guernsey, 8 Johns. 446,452 (N.Y. 1811).
224. For bankruptcy law of New Jersey, see Peter J. Coleman, supra note 211, at 134-35 (1771, 1783). For
bankruptcy law of New York, see id. at 109, 123-24 (1755, 1784).
225. See Vanuxen v. Hazelhursts, 4 NJ.L 218, 222 (1818) (1542 statute; English bankruptcy statutes never
extended to America); Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375, 381, 388 (1823) (1624 statute inapplicable to N.Y. fraudulent
conveyance law); Craig v. Ward, 9 Johns. 197, 201 (1812) (same); see also Dale v. Cooke, 4 Johns. Ch. 11, 13
(1819) (1732 statute applicable to set-off in our statute); Duncan v. Lyon, 3 Johns. Ch. 351, 360 (1818) (same);
Lansing v. Prendergast, 9 Johns. 127, 128 (1812) (1732 statute applicable to discharge in our 1789 act); Frost v.
Carter, 1 Johns Cas. 73, 75 (1799) (same).
The United States Bankruptcy Act of 1800 did have a reputed ownership clause for which the courts
applied the 1624 statute. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 27, 2 U.S. Stat 19, 28 (1800); Sands v. Codwine, 4 Johns.
536, 563 (1808); see also Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 Johns. Ch. 266, 283 (1822) (1732 statute); Murray v. De
Rottenham, 6 Johns. Ch. 52, 63 (N.Y. 1822) (1705 statute; the 1800 U.S. act consolidated all the English
bankruptcy statutes)); Kingston v. Wharton, 17 Pa. (2 Serg. & Rawle) 208, 216 (1816) (same); Blythe v. Johns,
14 Pa. (5 Binn.) 247, 248 (1812) (same); Ruggan v. West, 10 Pa. (1 Binn.) 263, 269 (1808) (same).
226. See 1807 Ind. Terr. Laws, ch. 24, p. 139 ("The Common Law of England, all statutes or acts of the
British Parliament, made in aid of the Common Law, prior to the fourth year of the reign of King James the first
... shall be considered, as of full force."); 1812 Il. Ter. Laws, p. 5 ("all the laws passed by the Legislature of the
Indiana Territory which were in force on [3-1-1809] ... shall.., remain until altered or repealed. ...).
227. See 1796 Verm. Laws, p. 4; 1787 Vem. Laws, p. 30; 1782 Verm. Laws, p. 101-02; 1779 Verm. Laws,
p. 36-37.
228. See Act Dividing Indiana Territory, 2 U.S. Stat. 309, § 5 (1805) (providing Indiana Territorial law for
Michigan Territory only for pending lawsuits).
229. See 1810 Mich. Terr. Laws (Cass Code of 1816), reprinted in 1 W.S. GEORGE & CO., LAWS OF THE
TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 210,900-02 (1871) (1821).
230. See Chene v. Compau (Mich. 1828); 1 TRANSACTIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF
MICHIGAN, 1825-36 82 (William Wirt Blume ed., 1940); Northwest Territory Act, 1 U.S. Stat. 51 (1787)
("benefits... of judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law.").
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Many learned jurists regarded the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute as merely
declarative or in affirmance of the pre-existing English common law.231
The sixth group included Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota. The organic act
of each continued the predecessor entity's law. For Ohio, the continued law was the
1795 Act of the Northwest Territory adopting the English common law and English
statutes enacted before 1607.232 For Wisconsin, it was the 1828 Michigan opinion
adopting the English common law.233 For Iowa and Minnesota it was the law of
Wisconsin.2' Ohio, Wisconsin, and Iowa each passed a statute repealing that law
in 1806, 1839, and 1840, respectively.23 So Minnesota continued the Wisconsin
repealer. Never-the-less, Ohio still followed the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance
Statute.
236
B. The Four American Rules
So in the northern states, the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute, but not the
Bankruptcy Statutes, were effective for Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio. One
could expect them to adopt the absolute-conditional rule or the rebuttable rule
depending on whether they had adopted the sale of goods provision of the 1677
Statute of Frauds. Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey,
and Ohio adopted the rebuttable rule,237 Connecticut eventually adopted the
heightened rebuttable rule,"8 and Indiana and Illinois adopted the absolute-
conditional rule. 39 Rhode Island had no pre-chattel mortgage act opinions. Vermont
and Michigan had adopted only the English common law. To the extent that
231. See, e.g., 4 KENT, supra note 68, at 463. But see supra note 32 for the contrary view.
232. See OHo 1802 CONsr., § 4 ("Laws and part of laws now in force in this Territory, not inconsistent with
this constitution, shall continue and remain in full effect until repealed .... "); LAws OF THE NORTHWEST
TERRITORY, 1788-1800 (Theodore Calvin Pease ed., 1925), 253 ("'e common law of England, all statutes or acts
of the British Parliament made in aid of the common law, prior to the fourth year of the reign of King James the
first... shall be the rule of decision .... ).
233. See Wisconsin Territorial Act, § 12, 5 U.S. Stat. 10, 15 (1836) ("The existing laws of the Territory of
Michigan shall be extended over the said Territory so far as the same shall not be incompatible with the provisions
of this act, subject nevertheless, to be... repealed.").
234. For Iowa, see Iowa Territorial Act, § 12, 5 U.S. Stat. 235, 239 (1838) (continuing the laws of
Wisconsin).
For Minnesota, see Minnesota Territorial Act, § 12, 9 U.S. Stat. 403, 407 (1849) ("the laws in force in
the Territory of Wisconsin at the date of admission of the State of Wisconsin [i.e. 1848] shall continue").
235. See 1840 Iowa Terr. Laws, ch. 29, p. 20; 1805 Ohio Laws 1806, p. 38 (Jan. 2, 1806); 1839 Wisc. Laws,
p. 404-07.
236. See Burgett's Lessee v. Burgett, 1 Ohio 469,473 (1824).
237. See Haskell v. Greeley, 3 Me. 425 (1825); Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. 404 (1808); Haven v. Low, 2
N.H. 13 (1819); Hendricks v. Mount, 5 NJ. Law 850 (1820); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1810);
Rogers v. Dare, Wright 137 (Ohio Cty. Ct. 1832).
Ohio had not adopted the sale of goods provision. See 1810 Ohio Laws, reprinted in Ohio, AcTs OF A
GENERAL NATURE, ENACTFD, REVISED AND ORDERED TO BE PRINTED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-NINTH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF OMO 218 (1831); 3 REED, supra note 139, at 325-26, and so perhaps should
have adopted the absolute-conditional rule.
238. See Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824). The heightened rebuttable rule required more than just the
nonpossessory secured transaction to rebut the presumption of fraud from the debtor's possession of the collateral.
239. See Jordan v. Turner, 3 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1833); Thornton v. Davenport, 2 Ill. 295 (1836).
Indiana had adopted the sale of goods provision, see 1830 Ind. Laws, ch. 41, § 21, p. 269, 274 ($30.00),
and so perhaps should have adopted the rebuttable rule. Illinois did not adopt the sale of goods provision. See 1833
11. Rev. Code, p. 313; 1827 111. Rev. Code, p.230; 3 REED, supra note 139, at 293-94.
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common law included the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute, they also might
adopt one of these two rules. Michigan adopted the rebuttable rule, and Vermont
eventually the heightened rebuttable rule.' Pennsylvania had adopted both the
Fraudulent Conveyance Statute and the reputed ownership clause from the 1624
Bankruptcy Statute but not the sale of goods provision of the 1677 Statute of
Frauds.24 So Pennsylvania courts would have a choice of the absolute-conditional
rule and the per se fraud rule. Pennsylvania started with the absolute-conditional
rule, but eventually settled on the per se fraud rule, the only state to conform
eventually to the fraudulent theorists' view. 2 Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota,
having adopted no English law, could adopt any rule from any source." 3 But these
three states had no pre-chattel mortgage act opinions.
Opinions from these northern states upholding the nonpossessory secured
transaction when challenged by a third party numbered seventy-six out of one
hundred seven opinions. 2' So appellate judges in the northern United States
240. See Jackson v. Dean, 1 Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845); Tobias v. Francis, 3 Verm. 423 (1830).
Michigan had adopted the sale of goods provision. See 1819 Mich. Laws, reprinted in 1 Michigan,
LAWS OF THE TERRrrORY OF MICrIGAN 461, 468 (1871) ($25.00).
241. See CAIEs, supra note 134, at 376.
242. See Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819) (per se fraud rule); Morgan's Executors v.
Biddle, 6 Pa. (1 Yeates) 3 (1791) (absolute-conditional rule).
243. Wisconsin and Minnesota adopted the sale of goods provision, but not Iowa. See 3 REED, supra note
139, at 297-98 (Iowa), 311 (Minnesota), & 340-41 (Wisconsin).
244. For actions involving judgment lien creditors, see D'Wolf v. Harris, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 147 (1830) (won);
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828) (New York law) (won); Toby v. Reed, 9 Conn. 216 (1832)
(lost); Patten v. Smith, 5 Conn. 196 (1824) (lost); Rhines v. Phelps, 8 m. 455 (1846) (lost); Letcher v. Norton, 5
M. 575 (1843) (won). For unidentified actions involving judgment lien creditors, see Thornton v. Davenport, 2 1M.
295 (1836) (won); Kitchell v. Bratton, 2 M. 300 (1836) (won); Hankins v. Ingols, 4 Blackf. 34 (Ind. 1834) (won);
Watson v. Williams, 4 Blackf. 26 (Ind. 1835) (won); Jordan v. Turner, 3 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1833) (lost); Abbott v.
Goodwin, 20 Me. 409 (1841) (won); Smith v. Putney, 18 Me. 87 (1841) (won); Cutter v. Copeland, 18 Me. 127
(1841) (won); Ingraham v. Martin, 15 Me. 373 (1839) (won); Melody v. Chandler, 12 Me. 282 (1835) (won);
Gleason v. Drew, 9 Me. 79 (1832) (won); Holbrook v. Baker, 5 Me. 309 (1826) (won); Reed v. Jewett, 5 Me. 96
(1827) (won); Bartels v. Harris, 4 Me. 146 (1826) (won); Ulmer v. Hills, 5 Me. 326 (1832) (won); Brinley v.
Spring, 7 Me. 241 (1831) (won); Haskell v. Greeley, 3 Me. 425 (1825) (won); Fletcher v. Willard, 31 Mass. 464
(1833) (won); Macomber v. Parker, 31 Mass. 497 (1833) (won); Merrill v. Hunnewell, 30 Mass. 213 (1832) (lost);
Hunt v. Halton, 30 Mass. 216 (1832) (won); Summer v. Hamlet, 29 Mass. 76 (1831) (won); Johns v. Church, 29
Mass. 557 (1832) (won); Adams v. Wheeler, 27 Mass. 199 (1830) (won); Reed v. Upton, 27 Mass. 522 (1830)
(won); Carrington v. Smith, 25 Mass. 419 (1829) (won); Shumway v. Rutter, 24 Mass. 56 (1828) (lost); Ayer v.
Bartlett, 23 Mass. 71 (1827) (won); Butterfield v. Baker, 22 Mass. 526 (1827) (lost); Ward v. Sumner, 22 Mass.
59 (1827) (won); Parks v. Hall, 19 Mass. 206 (1824) (won); Homes v. Crane, 19 Mass. 607 (1824) (won); Bartlett
v. Williams, 18 Mass. 288 (1823) (won); Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. 388 (1822) (won); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17
Mass. 110 (1821) (lost); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. 197 (1821) (won); Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. 606 (1822)
(won); Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 287 (1811) (won); Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. 423 (1810) (won); Portland
Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. 661 (1808) (won); Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. 404 (1808) (won); Jackson v. Dean, 1
Doug. 519 (Mich. 1845) (won); Ash v. Savage, 5 N.H. 545 (1831) (won); Haven v. Low, 2 N.H. 13 (1819) (won);
Hall v. Snowhili, 14 N.J. Law 8 (1833) (won); Randal v. Cook, 17 Wend. 54 (N.Y. S. CL 1837) (lost); Doane v.
Eddy, 16 Wend. 523 (N.Y. S. Ct 1837) (lost); Look v. Comstock, 15 Wend. 244 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1836) (lost); Patchin
v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1834) (won); Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1834) (lost);
Ferguson v. Lee, 9 Wend. 258 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1832) (lost); Langdon v. Buell, 9 Wend. 80 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1832) (lost);
Hall v. Tuttle, 8 Wend. 375 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1832) (won); Bailey v. Burton, 8 Wend. 338 (N.Y. 1831) (lost);
McLachland v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348 (N.Y. S. CL 1829) (lost); Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N.Y. S. Ct.
1829) (lost); Sttson v. Brown, 7 Cow. 731 (N.Y. S. CL 1827) (lost); Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. 323 (N.Y. S. Ct.
1826) (won); Bissell v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1824) (won); Ludlow v. Hurd, 19 Johns. 102 (N.Y. S.
Ct. 1821) (won); Weller v. Wayland, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. 1817) (won); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch.
283 (N.Y. 1817) (won); Collins v. Myer 16 Ohio 547 (1847) (lost); Kellog v. Brennan, 14 Ohio 72 (1846) (lost);
Clark v. Jack, 47 Pa. (7 Watts) 375 (1838) (won); Jenkins v. Eichelberger, 44 Pa. (4 Watts) 121 (1835) (won);
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provided numerous examples of nonpossessory secured transactions enforced
against third parties in the forty years before the adoption of their respective chattel
mortgage acts, from 1791 to 1832.
The nineteenth century American legal writers did not concur in the fraudulent
conveyance theory.US They discerned a pre-chattel mortgage act rule to handle the
nonpossessory secured transaction when challenged by third parties. For them
different courts and the same courts at different times had held widely different
doctrines, sometimes treating the nonpossessory secured transaction as absolutely
void as a fraudulent conveyance, sometimes as prima facie void but rebuttable, and
sometimes valid until impeached by other evidence of fraud.2 The nineteenth
century record clearly did not support the sudden appearance of the nonpossessory
secured transaction after the adoption of the chattel mortgage acts.
IV. CONCLUSION
When Glanville first recorded the English common law, Anglo-American secured
transaction law confronted the tension between the rules used by Roman law
permitting the nonpossessory secured transaction and by Germanic law banning the
transaction. Controlled by Normans, England opted for the Germanic ban.
Although developing the forms necessary for the nonpossessory secured
transaction by 1500, the conditional sale and conditional deed, the ban persisted as
long as the statutes favored alternative security devices, namely the pledge and the
collusive judgment, the major competing security device. But the allowance of
interest after 1571 obviated the advantage of the pledge to surreptitiously generate
Myers v. Harvey, 39 Pa. (2 Pen. & W.) 478 (1831) (won); Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826)
(lost); Clow v. Woods, 20 Pa. (5 Serg. & Rawle) 275 (1819) (lost); Morgan's Executors v. Biddle, 6 Pa. (I Yeates)
3 (1791) (won); Sturgis v. Warren, 11 Vrm. 432 (1839) (lost); Woodward v. Gates, 9 Verm. 358 (1837) (lost);
Tobias v. Francis, 3 Verm. 423 (1830) (lost); Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Verm. 555 (1829) (won).
For actions dealing with purchasers, see Morris v. Grover, 3 M. 528 (1840) (lost); Pritchard v. Low, 15
Me. 48 (1838) (won); Lane v. Borland, 14 Me. 77 (1836) (won); Tibbets v. Towle, 12 Me. 341 (1835) (won); Lunt
v. Whitaker, 10 Me. 310 (1833) (won); Sawyer v. Shaw, 9 Me. 47 (1832) (won); Murray v. Burtis, 15 Wend. 212
(N.Y. S. Ct. 1836) (won); Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1832) (won); Lewis v.
Stevenson, 2 Hall 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (won); Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 (N.Y. S. CL 1810) (won);
Hooban v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 509 (1847) (won); Hombeck v. Vanmetre, 9 Ohio 153 (1839) (won).
For actions concerning general creditors, see Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63 (1831) (lost); Staff v.
Knox, 2 Conn. 215 (1817) (book debt: lost); Clark v. Richards, I Conn. 54 (1814) (case: lost); Witwell v. Vincent,
21 Mass. 452 (1825) (assumpsit: won); Northeast Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass. 274 (1820) (won); Jewett
v. Warren, 12 Mass. 300 (1815) (won); Peters v. Ballister, 20 Mass. 475 (1825) (won); Hendricks v. Mount, 5 N.J.
Law 850 (1820) (case: won); Welsh v. Bekey, 38 Pa. (1 Pen. & W.) 57 (1829) (lost); Passmore v. Eldridge, 27 Pa.
(12 Serg. & Rawle) 198 (1824) (won); Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Verm. 115 (1826) (won).
For actions treating another secured party, see The Mary, 16 F. Cas. 938, 1 Wash. C.C. 226 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1824) (Connecticut law) (lost); Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. 512 (1824) (won); Levy v. Welsh, 2 Edw. Ch.
438 (N.Y. 1835) (foreclosure: won); Rogers v. Dare, Wright 137 (Ohio Cty. Ct. 1832) (won).
245. See 2 FRANCIS HILLARD, THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 401 (1864);
JONES, supra note 62, at 262-63 (citing the absolute-conditional rule used by the English and describing the
absolute portion as a per se fraud rule). See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text for the absolute-conditional
rule.
246. See 2 HULAP.D, supra note 245, at 401; JONES, supra note 62, at 262-63 (citing the absolute-
conditional rule and describing the absolute portion as a per se fraud rule); ABNER THOMAS, CHArEL MORTGAGES
AND CONDrTIONAL SALES: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 158-59 (1889) (citing the absolute-conditional rule and the rebuttable rule).
See supra notes 117-59 & 169-83 and accompanying text for the rebuttable and per se fraud rules.
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interest under the usury ban. And the 1677 Statute of Frauds destroyed the priority
of the collusive judgment by dating its priority from the time the creditors delivered
the writ of execution to the sheriff for execution, rather than the date of entry of the
execution writ, shortly after the entry of the judgment and before the lending. Soon
thereafter the nonpossessory secured transaction appeared in both England and
America. Only the absence of a speedy levy mechanism, enjoyed by the collusive
judgment, held back the full development of the nonpossessory secured transaction.
During the eighteenth century, the Anglo-American nonpossessory secured
transaction when challenged by third parties, predominantly judgment creditors,
faced threats from the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute and the reputed
ownership clause of the 1624 Bankruptcy Statute. The courts generally upheld the
transaction under the absolute-conditional rule designed to benefit the landed
aristocrats, and later the rebuttable rule devised by the newly emergent merchant
aristocrats to allow oral transactions in compliance with the sale of goods provision
of the 1677 Statute of Frauds, both in England and the United States when
challenged under the 1571 Fraudulent Conveyance Statute. Courts intended both the
absolute-conditional rule and the rebuttable rule to uphold honest transactions
against adversely affected third parties. Only where the reputed ownership clause
applied, for English merchants in bankruptcy proceedings and later for
Pennsylvanian merchants, did the courts strike down the nonpossessory secured
transaction as fraudulent. Courts generally intended the per se fraud rule to protect
bankruptcy's ratable distribution.
By focusing on the few Pennsylvanian cases applying the per se fraud rule in the
United States, and then only after 1819, u' the fraudulent theorists have cut off any
attempt to understand the raison d'itre for the transaction, thereby complicating
their subsequent efforts to justify the transaction. The transaction long served a
useful function to compel compliance with promises after the collapse of the
collusive judgment in 1677 until made fraudulent by the chattel mortgage acts
against third parties, unless filed, in order to force their public registration.
247. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 8, at 8. Two later Pennsylvanian opinions followed Clow. See Welsh
v. Bekey, 38 Pa. (1 Pen. & W.) 57 (1829); Martin v. Mathiot, 29 Pa. (14 Serg. & Rawle) 214 (1826).
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